al. (2006) find that when there is a high proportion of external directors they are less likely to engage in fraud, which is consistent with the international literature. Chen et al. (2006) also argue that the combination of CEO and chair tends to lead to higher instances of fraud. A plausible explanation of this finding is that managers with more power are likely to abuse their positions and engage in fraudulent activities. However, based on their findings, Li and Naughton (2007) argue that board size and board composition do not impact on firm performance. One possible explanation might come from the launch of new policies and rules in the Chinese stock market in recent years. New policies detail the regulations covering board independence for all public firms. With the introduction of the requirement for greater board independence, board size typically increased as a consequence. Therefore these board variables are no longer distinguishable to investors. Alternatively, a theoretical explanation could be that the factors are endogenous and therefore do not have explanatory potential (Harris and Raviv, 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Clarke (2006) also questions the efficiency of outside directors in China because the unclear structure and their function is not clearly defined.
Another interesting board topic in China is the role of the supervisory board. Chinese listed companies adopt a two-tier board structure, a Board of Directors and a Supervisory Board. Xiao et al. (2004) and Dahya et al. (2003) question the usefulness of the supervisory board and suggest further improvement of the supervisory board’s independency and function enforcement. Clarke (2006) also states that the board of supervisors has been unable to play the monitoring role in Chinese companies simply because the supervisory board has no significant powers to monitor the daily business operations and appoint senior management members.
3.1.2 Ownership and Control: State and Institutional Ownership
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been well documented. Recently, much of the research focuses on the behaviour of blockholders. Holderness (2003) reports that insiders control approximately 20 percent of the ownership of listed corporations in the U.S.. La Porta et al. (1998) also posit that ownership is heavily concentrated in developing economies. Claessens et al. (2000) find 8
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