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A Review of Corporate Governance in China

that more than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder, that the separation of management from ownership is rare and family controlled corporations are very common in East Asian countries. Faccio et al. (2001) report that family ownership in East Asia leads to severe conflicts with other stakeholders and poor firm performance. However, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that family owned firms perform better than nonfamily owned firms in the well regulated and transparent markets, because family ownership can reduce agency problems. Denis and McConnell (2003) conclude that concentrated ownership most often has a positive effect on firm value, in that large-block shareholders can monitor and control the company’s daily business activities to minimize agency costs. Holderness (2003) also confirms that block ownership can be motivated by the benefits of control, such as the decision rights and personal privileges.

In China, the major shareholders are likely to be institutions and the state rather than individuals, and the majority of publicly traded companies are state-controlled (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Prior studies have investigated the relationship between state ownership and firm performance in China, and find that firm accounting performance is negatively related to the level of direct state ownership (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qi et al. 2000; Hovey et al. 2003). If the state controls the company, it is not surprising that politicians and state-controlling owners sit on most board seats. The likelihood of finding a director representing minority shareholders is very small. The possible explanation of this phenomenon is that local politicians can use their connections to influence both the market and the firms under their jurisdictions, because at this stage the Chinese economy remains relationship-based, and firms can benefit from the services provided by politicians in creating economic rents and enforcing transactions (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Mallin and Rong (1998) also argue that guanxi (personal relationships) still plays an important role in business practices in China.

Another unique feature of the Chinese corporate governance model is large institutional shareholdings. As mentioned above, tradable A-shares only represent a small proportion of the total shares outstanding. In China, institutional shares, normally referred to as legal person shares, have two types of holdings: state legal person shares and legal person 9

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