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A Review of Corporate Governance in China

1999) and predominating qualitative studies that involve surveys and interviews (Mar and Young, 2001; Tobin, 2005).

3.1 Internal Governance

3.1.1 Board of Directors

Issues related to boards of directors have been well documented. The major responsibility of board of directors is to minimize costs that arise from the separation of ownership and decision control of the modern corporation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board of directors receives its authority for internal control and other decisions from the stockholders of corporations. The major responsibilities of the board are to hire, fire, monitor and compensate management, and ensure that shareholders’ wealth is maximized. Traditionally, corporate board research globally has mainly focused on the relationship between board size (Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002), management compensation (Core et al., 1999; Martin and Thomas, 2005), board composition (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Bhagat and Black, 2002), the separation of CEO and chair (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Dahya et al., 2002) and firm performance and other strategic decisions, such as CEO turnover and takeover activities. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provide a comprehensive review in this area.

The findings of empirical research can be summarised as follows: (1) a board with more outside directors is not associated with superior firm valuation, but is associated with better decision making, such as CEO appointment, executive compensation, and CEO turnover; (2) there is no conclusive answer to the relationship between board size, the separation of CEO and chair, and firm performance. Recently, more attention has been paid to the evolution and determinates of board size and structure (Lehn, et al., 2003; Linck et al., 2008), busy boards (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), and board interlocks (Larcker et al., 2005) in the corporate governance literature.

Turning to the Chinese studies, Liang and Li (1999) indicate that outside directors are positively associated with higher returns on investment in China, meanwhile, duality of titles and board size have no explanatory power on firm performance. Recently, Chen et 7

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