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Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

In the second set of experiments, the network topology is structured as a 20-layer binary tree. In each phase, a certain number of different paths are chosen at random, and each end node at a path sends packets to the victim. We change the number of the selected paths in each phase, and calculate the rate of the number of attack packets traced back successfully within the path tree. A successful traceback over here means the victim can trace the packet back to its source.

For all the experiments, the ICMP traceback message generating probability is set to be 1. With a lower probability, the victim requires more packets to redesign the path. The probability only influence the convergence time in path redesigning, which is not the focus of this set of experiments. This setting can largely reduce the time and space needed for the simulation. For example, each end node at a path could only send one packet to the victim. 4.3 Results

Figures 6 and 7 shows the results of the first set of experiments. Figure 6(a) shows the path tree designed in learning phase. Nodes with double circles and links with labels form the path-tree. In Fig. 6(b), nodes with squares are attackers. We can see that two of them are within the path-tree. Figure 7 is the outcome of the traceback operation. For attacker 6 and 10, the victim traced them back to the source; for attacker 16, it only traced to node 7, which is the closest to

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

the source within the path-tree.

Fig. 7 Traceback results

Figure 8 shows the results of the second set of experiments. It does not mark on the exact range of rate. Because in the second set of experiments we did not simulate with real Internet data such as the topology, and paths are selected at random each time. Each rate has no meaning by itself, but they together show a kind of tendency. In Fig. 8(a), the number of attack paths is fixed. When the number of learning paths increases, the rate of successful traceback goes up. This result coincides with our intuition. In Fig. 8(b), the number of attack paths increases as well as the learning paths. The rate of successful traceback goes up when the number of paths increases. With a fixed ICMP traceback message generating probability, having more learning paths means a longer learning phase. And we can conclude that a longer learning

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

phase may improve the probability of successful traceback.

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

(a) The number of attack paths is fixed

(b) The number of attack paths increases with the learning paths

Fig. 8 Rate of successful traceback

5 Conclusions

Defending against (D) DoS attacks is one of the hardest security problems on the Internet today. We propose an approach to deal with this problem in a combined way. In our approach, we apply Pi’s packet marking scheme in conjunction with ICMP traceback message in iTrace method, which allows the victim to design the path-tree in peace time, and quickly find the attacker during times of attack. The simple simulation carried out shows that our scheme is effective in defending against DoS attacks. Furthermore, work is needed at a larger scale and in real network environment to validate our approach.

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60273091), Blue Project in Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications (NY207118).

References

1.Computer Emergency Response Team. Cert advisory ca-2000-01:

denial-of-service developments. [2007-02-01]. doc.guandang.net CA-2000-01.html

2.Belenky A, Ansari N. On IP traceback. IEEE Communications Magazine,

2003, 41(7): 142–153

3.Savage S, Wetherall D, Karlin A, et al. Practical network support for IP

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