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Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

matching node, go to the next step.

2) Drop the first marking-bit-pattern in the path identifier from left, so we get a shorter path identifier, which indicates a sub-path. If the length of the new identifier is not zero, go to step one.

This process will be ended either because a matching node is found or because the length of the path identifier decreases to zero. If a matching node is found, the path from the node to the root is the attack path within the path-tree. If this is not the case, it shows that the attack path is not in the current path-tree. The victim can collect traceback packets and redesign the path in real time, in the same process as that described in iTrace method. In brief, the traceback operation is firstly carried out locally and then goes through the network if it is necessary. In this way, the efficiency improves. Following shows the traceback algorithm provided in pseudo C code. The traceback process is opposite to the path-tree designing process. It extracts a path from the path-tree using a path identifier.

/*attack_Pi = the path identifier extracted from attack packet; Path = the attack path found in path-tree */ path traceback(attack_Pi) {

Pi = attack_Pi; node = null;

/* search for possible attacking node inside the path-tree*/ while((node == null) && (Pi.length != 0) ) {

node = search_path-tree(Pi); //search for matching node Pi_trim(Pi); //get a sub-path identifier }

if(node != null) //extract the attacking path return(extract_path(node));

else /*collect traceback messages and redesign the path in

real time.*/ return(iTrace()); }

Attack source traceback is usually regarded as an after-the-fact response to a DoS attack, which is not a feasible one to stop an on-going attack [9]. In a DoS attack, when an attack packet is detected, the victim can do rapid packet filtering relying on the attack path identifier. Even if the attack packets use spoofed IP addresses, their path identifiers are still the same. Packet filtering enables rapid response to the attack, and traceback can discourage the attacker.

In a DDoS attack, it is hard to distinguish attack packets from normal packets, and their paths are mixed together. We argue that it is important for the victim to protect itself from the attack before more effective measures could be taken. Considering that the path-tree reflects the victim’s communication pattern to some extent, we can give packets sourced inside the path-tree high priority. As a result, part of

the normal traffic could be preserved. It can be regarded as an auxiliary measure in eliminating the DDoS attack.

4 Simulation and results

In this section, we present a simulation of the proposed scheme. All of the algorithms in the scheme have been implemented in NS-2. We first present the DoS attack model and then depict the design of the experiments. Finally, we present the results of our experiments. 4.1 DoS attack model

In order for a victim to protect it against attack packets, it must have a way to detect and identify the attack packet. Once the attack packet is identified, we can filter packets with the same path identifier and perform traceback within the path-tree. Attack packet identification is outside the scope of this article. However, to incorporate the use of our scheme, we model our DoS attack in two phases, similar to the attack model used in Pi’s experiments [5]. In the first phase, the learning phase, the victim analyzes all the packets sent to it, and use path identifiers and ICMP traceback messages to redesign the path-tree. In the second phase, the attack phase, the victim is assumed to have the power to determine whether a packet is an attack packet or a legitimate packet. In this phase, the victim stops redesigning the path-tree, and is forced to use path identifiers and the path-tree to perform packet filtering and traceback. 4.2 Experiment design

We designed two sets of experiments. The first set of experiments is a simple demo of our scheme, showing how it works. The network topology is shown in Fig. 6. In learning phase, nodes 10, 13, and 15 are selected as legitimate users to send packets to the victim. In attack phase, nodes 6, 10, and 16 are selected as attackers to send packets to the victim. Then we show the path-tree designed by the victim and the

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

traceback results.

(a) Learning phase (b) Attack phase

Fig. 6 Path-tree and attackers

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