









(a) Number of path (hops<16) (b) Number of path (hops<20)
Fig. 4 Traverse comparison of the two marking schemes
From the distribution of the collision rate shown in Figs. 3 and 4, we come to the conclusions as follows:
1)As shown in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), the collision rate reduces effectively if path lengths are considered, but it is not the case in Marking scheme 2 (Figs. 3(c) and (d)). If no overwriting happens in Marking scheme 1(Fig. 3(a)), the collision rate falls to zero, a perfect result.
2)In both marking schemes, the collision rate keeps going up as the number of the selected paths increases. In Pi scheme, the authors selected no more than 10 000 paths for testing and obtained fine results. We can also learn that in Fig. 3(c), the collision rate is less than 20% when paths are less than 10 000. When paths increase to 50 000, the collision rate jumps to 50%, making it difficult to distinguish different paths. In a DDoS attack, it is not impossible to have tens of thousands of attack paths.
3)As shown in Fig. 4, the collision rate in Marking scheme 1 is always lower than that in Marking scheme 2.
4)Considering the two marking schemes, the first one is an idealization because all the links to a node are distinguishable on their own; the second one is similar to Pi’s marking scheme and idealizes it in some aspects, for example, randomly distributed markings is the ideal result of hash function in Pi.
In brief, Pi’s marking scheme behaves well with moderate paths but not in large scale DDoS attacks. If the node could assign distinguishable markings to the links connected to it, then the collision rate will be cut down effectively. Assume that a node has l links, it needs log2l b to distinguish each link, which is not practical because of the limited space in the marking field. We can come to the conclusion that it is not easy to get low collision rate through improving the marking scheme.
path-tree designing component and antiDoS component. As shown in Fig. 5, packet marking components deployed at routers mark passing packets and send traceback messages. Path-tree designing components deployed at hosts design path-trees using received path identifiers and traceback messages. AntiDoS components deployed at hosts and routers perform traceback and packet filtering operations. In the remainder of this section we describe the marking algorithm and path-tree design algorithm and the method of defending





against DoS attacks in more detail.
Fig. 5 Framework of packet track and traceback mechanism
3.2 Packet marking algorithm
It is obvious that the measures taken in Pi’s marking scheme such as hashing and edge marking is to increase the marking’s entropy and self distinguishability. We also can learn from experiments in Sect. 2 that if the links connected to a node can be distinguished on the marking, the collision rate is the lowest among all the cases. In our scheme, instead of computing markings using Hash functions, the router tries the best to assign a different marking for each link connected to it. It can not be guaranteed that each link could get a different value. For an n b marking, there are at most 2n values to assign, and the number of links may be more than it.
Forwarding a packet, the router takes the value assigned to the link, where the packet is coming as the marking and inserts it into the marking field. Following is the pseudo C code for the marking algorithm:
/* ptmark = marking carried in the packet
3 Packet track and traceback mechanism
3.1 The framework
The framework of packet track and traceback mechanism is comprised of three components: packet marking component,
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