these, packets outside the attack paths may be filtered and the probability would rise because the number of attack paths increases.
To have an indepth view of Pi’s marking scheme, particularly the collision problem, we design two marking schemes and perform two sets of experiments. In the experiments, the Internet is modeled as a complete-binary tree referred to Ref. [5], rooted at the destination host. We assign a value to each node in the tree that can be used as the marking. The path identifier is 16 b and the marking-bit-pattern is one bit, so the identifier could hold markings of 16 routers at most. Theith node in a path inserts its marking into the jth marking-bit-pattern, where j equals i mod 16. The two marking schemes are depicted as follows:
Marking scheme 1 Set the value of node i as i mod 2, then it is uniformly distributed. Each node takes its own value as the marking. In this scheme, collisions might be induced in two cases. One of the paths is that with different length, which might be contained by one another, for instance, <R3,R2,R1> and <R2,R1> is such a case; the other one is that nodes close to the victim might overwrite the markings of nodes farther away because of the limited space in the marking field.
Marking scheme 2 Set a random value to each node,
then it is randomly distributed. Each node takes the value of its child from which the packet comes as the marking. We take it as an idealization of Pi’s edge marking scheme.
In each set of the experiments, we randomly select a given number of unrepeating nodes to send packets to the root, then compute their path identifiers and calculate the collision rate. We count collisions in two ways. One is the same with Pi: if two identifiers are the same, we count it as one collision. In the other way we take path lengths into account, where path length is the number of nodes that the packet has traversed. If two identifiers as well as their path lengths are the same, we count it as one collision. The collision rate equals the number of collisions divided by the total number of paths. We conduct each set of the experiments in two sizes of networks and take the hops of the longest path in the network as the measurement of the size of the network. One is within 16 hops and the other is within 20 hops. The upper boundary of the number of the selected paths is 10 000 and 50 000 for each size of networks. Figures 3 and 4 show the results of the experiments. For most of the data points in the figure, we perform approximately 10 to 50 independent tests and compute the average of the results. In Figs. 3 and 4, c1 denotes same identifier counts as a collision, c2 denotes same





identifier and same path length counts as a collision.





(a) Number of path (hops<16) in Marking scheme 1 case





(b) Number of path (hops<20) in Marking scheme 1 case





(c) Number of path (hops<16) in Marking scheme 2 case (d) Number of path (hops<20) in Marking scheme 2 case
Fig. 3 Distribution of collision rates
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