google浏览器安全架构介绍
TheSecurityArchitectureoftheChromiumBrowser
AdamUCBerkeleyBarth
UniversityCharlesofWashington
Reis ABSTRACT
Mostcurrentwebbrowsersemployamonolithicarchitec-turethatcombines“theuser”and“theweb”intoasingleprotectiondomain.Anattackerwhoexploitsanarbitrarycodeexecutionvulnerabilityinsuchabrowsercanstealsen-sitive lesorinstallmalware.Inthispaper,wepresentthesecurityarchitectureofChromium,theopen-sourcebrowseruponwhichGoogleChromeisbuilt.Chromiumhastwomodulesinseparateprotectiondomains:abrowserkernel,whichinteractswiththeoperatingsystem,andarenderingengine,whichrunswithrestrictedprivilegesinasandbox.Thisarchitecturehelpsmitigatehigh-severityattackswith-outsacri cingcompatibilitywithexistingwebsites.Wede neathreatmodelforbrowserexploitsandevaluatehowthearchitecturewouldhavemitigatedpastvulnerabilities.
1.INTRODUCTION
Inthepastseveralyears,thewebhasevolvedtobe-comeaviableplatformforapplications.However,mostwebbrowsersstillusetheoriginalmonolithicarchitectureintroducedbyNCSAMosaicin1993.Amonolithicbrowserarchitecturehasmanylimitationsforwebapplicationswithsubstantialclient-sidecode.Forexample,acrashcausedbyonewebapplicationtakesdowntheuser’sentirewebexperienceinsteadofjustthewebapplicationthatmisbe-haved[21].Fromasecuritypointofview,monolithicwebbrowsersruninasingleprotectiondomain,allowinganat-tackerwhocanexploitanunpatchedvulnerabilitytocom-promisetheentirebrowserinstanceandoftenrunarbitrarycodeontheuser’smachinewiththeuser’sprivileges.
Inthispaper,wepresentandevaluatethesecurityar-chitectureofChromium,theopen-sourcewebbrowseruponwhichGoogleChromeisbuilt.Chromiumusesamodulararchitecture,akintoprivilegeseparationinSSHD[18].Thebrowserkernelmoduleactsonbehalfoftheuser,whiletherenderingenginemoduleactsonbehalfof“theweb.”Thesemodulesruninseparateprotectiondomains,enforcedbyasandboxthatreducestheprivilegesoftherenderingengine.Evenifanattackercanexploitanunpatchedvulnerabilityintherenderingengine,obtainingtheprivilegesoftheentirerenderingengine,thesandboxhelpspreventtheattackerfromreadingorwritingtheuser’s lesystembecausethewebprincipaldoesnothavethatprivilege.
TheauthorsconductedthisworkwhileemployedbyGoogle.
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StanfordCollinJackson
University
GoogleGoogleChromeInc.
Team
Therehavebeenanumberofresearchproposalsformod-ularbrowserarchitectures[8,27,5,7]thatcontainmultipleprotectiondomains.LikeChromium’sarchitecture,theseproposalsaimtoprovidesecurityagainstanattackerwhocanexploitanunpatchedvulnerability.UnlikeChromium’sarchitecture,theseproposalstradeo compatibilitywithex-istingwebsitestoprovidearchitecturalisolationbetweenwebsitesorevenindividualpages.Thebrowser’ssecu-ritypolicy,knownasthe“same-originpolicy,”iscomplexandcanmakesuch ne-grainedisolationdi culttoachievewithoutdisruptingexistingsites.Users,however,demandcompatibilitybecauseawebbrowserisonlyasusefulasthesitesthatitcanrender.Tobesuccessful,amodularbrowserarchitecturemustsupporttheentirewebplatforminaddi-tiontoimprovingsecurity.
Chromium’sarchitectureallocatesthevariouscomponentsofamodernbrowserbetweenthebrowserkernelandtherenderingengine,balancingsecurity,compatibility,andper-formance.Thearchitectureallocateshigh-riskcomponents,suchastheHTMLparser,theJavaScriptvirtualmachine,andtheDocumentObjectModel(DOM),toitssandboxedrenderingengine.Thesecomponentsarecomplexandhis-toricallyhavebeenthesourceofsecurityvulnerabilities.Runningthesecomponentsinasandboxhelpsreducetheseverityofunpatchedvulnerabilitiesintheirimplementa-tion.Thebrowserkernelisresponsibleformanagingpersis-tentresources,suchascookiesandthepassworddatabase,andforinteractingwiththeoperatingsystemtoreceiveuserinput,drawtothescreen,andaccessthenetwork.Thear-chitectureisbasedontwodesigndecisions:
1.Thearchitecturemustbecompatiblewiththeexistingweb.Speci cally,thesecurityrestrictionsimposedbythearchitectureshouldbetransparenttowebsites.ThisdesigndecisiongreatlylimitsthelandscapeofpossiblearchitecturesbutisessentialinorderforChro-miumtobeusefulasawebbrowser.Forexample,thearchitecturemustsupportuploading lestowebsitesinordertobecompatiblewithweb-basedemailsitesthatletusersaddattachmentstoemails.2.ThearchitecturetreatstherenderingengineasablackboxthattakesunparsedHTMLasinputandproducesrenderedbitmapsasoutput(seeFigure1).Inpar-ticular,thearchitecturereliesontherenderingenginealonetoimplementthesame-originpolicy.Thisdesigndecisionreducesthecomplexityofthebrowserkernel’ssecuritymonitorbecausethebrowserkernelneedonlyenforcecoarse-grainedsecurityrestrictions.Forexam-ple,thebrowserkernelgrantstheabilitytouploada1
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