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chromium-security-architecture

google浏览器安全架构介绍

letoanentireinstanceoftherenderingengine,evenwhenthatprivilegeisonlyneededbyasinglesecurityorigin.

Thearchitecturedoesnotpreventanattackerwhocompro-misestherenderingenginefromattackingotherwebsites(forexample,byreadingtheircookies).Instead,thearchi-tectureaimstopreventanattackerfromreadingorwritingtheuser’s lesystem,helpingprotecttheuserfromadrive-bymalwareinstallation.

ToevaluatethesecurityofChromium’sarchitecture,weexaminethedisclosedbrowservulnerabilitiesinInternetEx-plorer,Firefox,andSafarifromtheprecedingyear.Foreachvulnerability,wedeterminewhichmodulewouldhavebeena ectedbythevulnerability,hadthevulnerabilitybeenpresentinChromium.We ndthat67.4%(87of129)ofthevulnerabilitieswouldhaveoccurredintherenderingengine,suggestingthattherenderingengineaccountsforasigni -cantfractionofthebrowser’scomplexity.

NotallrenderingenginevulnerabilitieswouldhavebeenmitigatedbyChromium’sarchitecture.Chromium’sarchi-tectureisdesignedtomitigatethemostseverevulnerabili-ties,namelythosevulnerabilitiesthatletanattackerexecutearbitrarycode.Ifanattackerexploitssuchavulnerabilityintherenderingengine,Chromium’sarchitectureaimstore-stricttheattackertousingthebrowserkernelinterface.We ndthat38ofthe87renderingenginevulnerabilitiesal-lowedanattackertoexecutearbitrarycodeandwouldhavebeenmitigatedbyChromium’sarchitecture.Theseaccountfor70.4%(38of54)ofalldisclosedvulnerabilitiesthatallowarbitrarycodeexecution.

Toevaluatethesecuritybene tsofsandboxingadditionalbrowsercomponents,weexaminedthearbitrarycodeexecu-tionvulnerabilitiesthatwouldhaveoccurredinthebrowserkernel.We ndthat72.7%(8of11)ofthevulnerabilitiesresultfrominsu cientvalidationofsystemcallsandwouldnothavebeenmitigatedbyadditionalsandboxing.Forex-ample,onesuchvulnerabilityinvolvedthebrowserimprop-erlyescapingaparametertoShellExecutewhenhandlingexternalprotocols.Althoughcountingvulnerabilitiesisanimperfectsecuritymetric[24],theseobservationsleadustobelievethatChromium’sarchitecturesuitablydividesthevariousbrowsercomponentsbetweenthebrowserkernelandtherenderingengine.

Byseparatingthebrowserintotwoprotectiondomains,onerepresentingtheuserandanotherrepresentingtheweb,Chromium’ssecurityarchitecturemitigatesapproximately70%ofcriticalbrowservulnerabilitiesthatletanattackerexecutearbitrarycode.Theremainingvulnerabilitiesaredi culttomitigatewithadditionalsandboxing,leadingustoconcludethatthearchitectureextractsmostofthesecu-ritybene tsofsandboxingwhilemaintainingperformanceandcompatibilitywithexistingwebcontent.

Wetookathree-prongedapproachtoevaluatingthecom-patibilityofChromium’sarchitecture.First,ourimplemen-tationofthearchitecturepasses99%of10,115compatibilitytestsfromtheWebKitproject.Thetestsourimplementa-tiondoesnotpassareduetoimplementationdetailsandarenotduetoarchitecturallimiations.Second,weman-uallyvisitedeachofthe500mostpopularwebsitesand xedanyincompatibilitieswefound.Third,wedeployourimplementationtomillionsofusersworld-wide.

2

Sandbox

Rendering

Engin

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e

IPC

HTML, JS, ...Rendered Bitmap

Browser Kernel

Figure1:Thebrowserkerneltreatstherendering

engineasablackboxthatparseswebcontentandemitsbitmapsoftherendereddocument.

Organization.Section2de nesathreatmodelforbrowserexploits.Section3detailsChromium’sarchitecture.Sec-tion4describesthesandboxusedtocon netherenderingengine.Section5explainsthebrowserkernelAPIusedbythesandboxedrenderingengine.Section6evaluatesthese-curitypropertiesofthearchitecture.Section7comparesChromium’sarchitecturewithotherbrowserarchitectures.Section8concludes.

2.THREATMODEL

InordertocharacterizethesecuritypropertiesofChro-mium’sarchitecture,wede neathreatmodelbyenumerat-ingtheattacker’sabilitiesandgoals.Thesecurityarchitec-tureseekstopreventanattackerwiththeseabilitiesfromreachingthesegoals.Wecanusethisthreatmodeltoeval-uatehowe ectivelyChromium’sarchitectureprotectsusersfromattack.

AttackerAbilities.Weconsideranattackerwhoknowsanunpatchedsecurityvulnerabilityintheuser’sbrowserandisabletoconvincetheuser’sbrowsertorendermaliciouscontent.Typically,theseabilitiesaresu cienttocompro-misetheuser’smachine[20].Morespeci cally,weassumetheattackerhasthefollowingabilities:

1.Theattackerownsadomainname,sayattacker.com,thathasnotyetbeenaddedtothebrowser’smalwareblacklist[19].TheattackerhasavalidHTTPScer-ti cateforthedomain,andcontrolsatleastonehostonthenetwork.Theseabilitiescanbepurchasedforabout$5.2.Theattackerisabletoconvincetheusertovisithisorherwebsite.Thereareanumberoftechniquesforconvincingtheusertovisitattacker.com,suchassendingoutspame-mail,hostingpopularcontent,ordrivingtra cviaadvertising.Itisdi culttopricethisability,but,inapreviousstudy,wewereabletoattractaquarterofamillionusersforabout$50[1].

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