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企业合并和市场控制Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

verticallyintegrated rmwithanupstreamdivisionsellinganintermediatecomponenttoadownstreamdivision.Tocomputethedivisionalpro tsandlosses,the rmneedsaneconomicallymeaningful\transferprice"forthecomponent.Ifthereisamarketforthecomponentexternaltothe rm,thenthe rmcanusethatmarketpriceasabenchmarkforitsowninternalcalculations.Withoutamarketprice,however,atransferpricemustbeestimatedinsomeway|usuallyonacost-plusbasis,orasnegotiatedbetweenthedivisions|butthesesubstitutetransferpriceswillnecessarilycontainlessinformationthantruemarketprices; rmsrelyingonthemwillsu er.The rmisthusconstrainedbytheneedforexternalmarketsforallinternallytradedgoods.Inotherwords,no rmcanbecomesolargethatitisboththeuniqueproduceranduserofanintermediateproduct;thennomarket-basedtransferpriceswillbeavailable,andthe rmwillbeunabletocalculatedivisionalpro tandlossandthereforebeunabletoallocateresourcescorrectlybetweendivisions.Likethecentrallyplannedeconomy,the rmneedsmarketsignalstoguideitsactions;withoutthemthe rmcannotsurvive.Themainstreamliteratureonthe rmhasyettoincorporatethisAustrianinsight,thoughrecognitionthatthesocialistcalculationdebatecoversthemainissuesoforganizationtheoryisbeginningtoappear(Williamson,1991).

2ManagerialDiscretionandtheFinancialMarkets

Asmentionedabove,avitalfunctionofmergersandcorporaterestructuringistolimitmanagerialdiscretion.Criticsofthecorporation,atleastsinceBerleandMeans(1932),havearguedthatthemodern rmisrunnotbyitsowners,theshareholders,butbysalariedmanagers,whoseinterestsaredi erentfromthoseofshareholdersandincludeexecutiveperks,prestige,andsimilarrewards.Ifthecorporationisdi uselyheld,noindividualshareholderhassu cientmotivationtoengagein(costly)monitoringmanagerialdecisions,andhencediscretionwill ourishattheexpenseofthemarketvalueofthe rm(whatwewouldnowcallaprincipal{agentproblem).HenryManne'sseminalpaper,\MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl"(1965),respondedthatmanagerialdiscretionwillbelimitedaslongasthereexistsanactivemarketforcontrolofcorporations.Whenmanagersengageindiscretionarybehavior,thesharepriceofthe rmfalls,andthisinvitestakeoverandsubsequentreplacementofincumbentmanagement.(Othermechanismstolimitmanagerialdiscretionarealsopresent,includingthemarketformanagersitself[Fama,1980].)

Interestingly,thecentralinsightofManne'spaperisalsofoundinMises'sHumanAction(1949),inthepassagedistinguishingwhatMisescalls\pro tmanagement"from\bureau-craticmanagement"(pp.302{304).Itistrue,Misesargues,thatthesalariedmanagersofacorporationindeedholdconsiderableautonomyovertheday-to-dayoperationsofthe rm.Nonetheless,theshareholdersmaketheultimatedecisionsaboutallocatingresourcestothe rm,intheirdecisionstobuyandsellstock:

[TheBerle{Means]doctrinedisregardsentirelytherolethatthecapitalandmoneymar-

ket,thestockandbondexchange,whichapertinentidiomsimplycallsthe\market,"

playsinthedirectionofcorporatebusiness....[T]hechangesinthepricesofcommon

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