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企业合并和市场控制Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

1TheNatureoftheFirm

Why,ingeneral,do rmsexpandanddiversify?Andwhydotheysometimesretreatand\refocus"?Intheperfectlycompetitivemodel, rmsassuchdonotexistatall;the\ rm"isaproductionfunction,itse cientoutputrangeandmixgivenbyeconomiesofscaleandscope.Outsidethetextbookmodel,however,economiesofscaleandscopecannotexplainthesizeandshapeofthe rmasownershipstructure.Economiesofscale,forexample,implythatcertainquantitiesofoutputcanbeproducedmoree cientlywhentheyareproducedtogether.Butthisdoesnotexplainwhythejointproductionmusttakeplaceinasingle rm;absenttransactionaldi culties,twoindependent rmscouldsimplycontracttosharethesameplantorfacilityandjointlyproducethee cientlevelofoutput.

RonaldCoaseinhiscelebrated1937paperon\TheNatureoftheFirm"wasthe rsttoexplainthatthesizeofthe rmdependsnotonlyonproductivetechnology,butalsoonthecostsoftransactingbusiness.IntheCoasianframework,asdevelopedandexpandedbyWilliamson(1975,1985)andothers,thedecisiontoorganizetransactionswithinthe rmasopposedtoontheopenmarket|the\makeorbuydecision"|dependsontherelativecostsofinternalversusexternalexchange.Useofthemarketmechanismentailscertaincosts:discoveringtherelevantprices,negotiatingandenforcingcontracts,andsoon.Withinthe rm,theentrepreneurmaybeabletoreducesuchcostsbycoordinatingtheseactivitieshimself(thoughinternalprocurementwillfaceitsowninformationalandincentiveproblemsaswell).Inshort,theboundaryofthe rmdependsonorganizational,aswellasproductive,considerations.Thesecaninturnbebrokendownintoaseriesofoperationalfactors:thepresenceoftransaction-speci cassets,uncertaintyandemployeeopportunism,andthelike.Recently,thistransactioncosttheoryofthe rmhasbeenchallengedandextendedbytheconceptofeconomic\capabilities,"anexplanationforthescopeofthe rmbasedoncomplementaritiesinknowledgeandorganizationalroutine(NelsonandWinter,1982;Langlois,1992).

Unfortunately,thegrowingliteratureonthetheoryofthe rmhasyettoproduceafullysatisfactoryexplanationofthelimitsto rmsize(Williamson,1985,chapter6).InCoase'swords,\Whydoestheentrepreneurnotorganizeonelesstransactionoronemore?"Or,moregenerally,\Whyisnotallproductioncarriedoninonebig rm?"(Coase,1937,pp.42{43).Theoristshaveo eredvariousspan-of-controlargumentstoaccountforthelimitstointernalcoordination,butnoneofthesehasbeencompletelyadequate.HereAustriantheoryhasanobviouscontributiontomake,bytheapplicationofMises'stheoremontheimpossibilityofeconomiccalculationundersocialism.Rothbard(1962,pp.545{48)hasshownhowtheneedformonetarycalculationintermsofactualpricesnotonlyexplainsthefailuresofcentralplanningundersocialism,butalsoplacesanupperboundonthesizeofthe rm.

Thelarge,integrated rmistypicallyorganizedasgroupsofsemi-autonomousbusinessunitsor\pro tcenters,"witheachunitordivisionspecializinginaparticular nalorintermediateproduct.Thecentralmanagementofthe rmusesstatementsofdivisionalpro tandlosstoallocatephysicaland nancialcapitalacrossthedivisions;morepro tabledivisionsarerewardedandexpanded,whilethoseshowinglowerpro tsarescaledback.Theroleofeconomiccalculationcanbeillustratedasfollows:Consideradecentralized,

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