First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin
L. G. Epstein and S.E. Zm,‘Fml-order’
nsk avemon
397
consumption takes place. Since the bulk of the behavioral/experimental evidence regarding individual choice under uncertainty is based on choices amongst timeless gambles, that evidence can be brought to bear upon the nature of CL. For a survey of the evidence we have in mind see Machina (1982), who argues that widespread and systematic violations of expected utility are indicated. Segal (1987a, b) has shown that the rank-dependent model (16), with the functional form (21) for g, can explain the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes if (and only if> y< 1. In particular, the Mehra and Prescott specification (y= 1 and LY p) is irzcompatible with such evidence.= Segal and Spivak (1990) describe some behavioral distinctions between first- and second-order risk aversion. Only in the latter case is it true that any actuarially favorable bet would be accepted at some sufficiently small scale. Two related behavioral observations that would support first-order risk aversion are: (i) specialization in the safe asset in a two-asset portfolio choice in spite of a positive expected excess return to the risky asset and (ii> demand for full insurance (zero deductible) given positive but small marginal loading. Borch (1974, pp. 27-28) claims that there is empirical support for (ii). It is widely thought that the degree of portfolio diversification falls short of that predicted by the standard expected utility portfolio choice model; but admittedly, transactions costs, rather than misspecified preferences, could be the explanation. Even if it is admitted that y< 1, a magnitude for y must still be selected. Before addressing that problem we consider briefly z’ and its parameter cy[eq. (1711. As fig. 1 reveals, regardless of the choice of (Y, the corresponding P,.~ agrees with py (linear z’, cy= 1) to the first-order near-certainty, i.e., the respective indifference curves are tangent to one another on either side of the certainty line. Consequently, since our numerical simulations involve only small gambles about certainty, the choice of L’ is of little consequence for those simulations and we adopt Yaari’s specification L’(X)=x. The expected utility model has been thoroughly studied and applied and there exists a tradition concerning what constitutes a plausible value for the (constant) degree of relative risk aversion, namely that it be no greater than 10. In contrast, the preference specification adopted here is much less familiar and it is not immediately clear what constitutes a plausible magnitude for y. To shed some light on the magnitude of y we compare F,,, now denoted PG. and the expected utility function (31, denoted kz,, in th
e following way: For any binary gamble with m= Ei, X,<x,, and p,=p, write x,=mwhere u is the
i-1 P
1 -p
‘1’ ff,
x,=miof
l 1 l-p
P
l/2
(73
(23) (4), we can
standard
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