First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin
396
L.G. Epstem und SE. Zln,‘First-order‘ risk ar’erston
If u is not differentiable at a point 2, then the indifference curve through z will resemble that in fig. 1 and (20) will apply for gambles having expected value X. But this can happen only rarely since any increasing and concave function u can fail to be differentiable at most at a countable number of points. In contrast, for~~~ the indifference curve in fig. 1 is representative of all indifference curves and (20) holds for all binary gambles.
4. Calibration
of preferences
Intertemporal utility of the representative agent has the recursive structure (11, where the aggregator W has the CES form (2) and the risk preference function is prd. For the parameters of W, p, and p, we consider a standard range of values. We need to select a functional form for g and a parameter (Y for I’ defined in (17). For g we adopt the functional form
g(P)=PYr
(21)
where 0< y i 1 is a parameter. When y= 1 in (21), g(p)=p and pLr,, is the expected utility certainty equivalent defined in (3). The corresponding intertemporal utility function is that explored by EZ (1989, 1990) and Weil (1989, 1990). If further (Y= p, then the standard intertemporal expected utility model (e.g., Mehra and Prescott) is implied. Weil (1989) has shown that allowing CY#p, while maintaining y= 1, does not substantially improve the explanation of the equity premium. We attribute this finding to the fact that as long as y= 1 and regardless of whether or not cy= p, risk preferences exhibit only second-order risk aversion. On the other hand, if y< 1, there is first-order risk aversion with the coefficient li in (18)~(20) given by
k= (py -p)/p’/‘(
1
-p)“‘.
Since k is decreasing in y, we see that a smaller y implies greater aversion to small risks.[In fact, it implies increased aversion to all risks; see Chew, Karni, and Safra (1987I.l The numerical value of y is obviously of critical importance. It is natural to enquire whether there exists empi
rical support for first-order risk aversion in general, or for y< 1 in our particular specification. It is shown in EZ (1989) that the agent’s preference functional p defines attitudes towards timeless gambles, i.e., those which are resolved before further


















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