and confirm the limited protection of minority rights and highly concentrated ownership in Asia. Firms are normally controlled by one or more shareholders, thus the separation of management from ownership is rare and family controlled corporations are prevalent in East Asian countries. For example, the largest ten families control half of the total value of listed corporate assets in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand (Claessens et al. 2000). Traditionally, some large Korean business groups (Chaebols), such as Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo, were also family based (Ehrlich and Kang, 1999). In China, listed corporations are normally controlled by State and financial institutions, and tradable A-shares accounts for only a small part of total shares outstanding (Li and Naughton, 2007). Another interesting phenomenon in Asian countries is a pyramid ownership structure, which is defined as owning a controlling holding of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a controlling interest in another, a process that can be repeated a number of times (Claessens et al. 2000). This raises some important questions. Why is ownership concentration more prevalent in East Asian countries? And why is significant corporate wealth in East Asia concentrated among a few families? Generally speaking, block ownership is attractive to blockholders when they can attain private benefits from controlling the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, investors may feel confident that their benefits are well protected through block shareholdings, especially in some countries without well functioning investor protection law and effective enforcement (La Porta et al., 1999).
Corporate governance issues have come to the fore in China particularly since the late 1970s, because the development of the corporate governance system is recognized as a vital component of the restructuring of SOEs. Before the economic reforms, Chinese industry was dominated by state ownership, and SOEs were the major economic contributors. Managers in SOEs were required to fulfil the production plans specified by the government rather than maximize the investment returns for the only investor — the state. The governance structure of SOEs was an integral part of the general government framework. At that time, SOEs were characterized by low productivity and efficiency, high input and low output.
5
A Review of Corporate ... 33页 4下载券 a review of corporate ... 14...Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China Issued by: China...
Corporate Governance in China Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional...This article offers a preliminary review of the literature on Chinese ...
A REVIEW OF CAMA 1990 ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AUDITA REVIEW OF CAMA 1990 ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AUDIT隐藏>> A REVIEW OF CAMA 1990: ISSUES...
Corporate Governance in China: A Study of the Interdependent Model_英语考试_...A Review of Corporate ... 471人阅读 33页 4下载券 a review of corporate...
This study is a review of ownership structure and corporate governance in China. It aims to appraise some issues in ownership structure and corporate ...
Corporate Governance A C... 5页 1财富值 Corporate Governance in ... 34页 免费 A Review of Corporate Go... 33页 10财富值 a review of corporate go...
China Economic Review 14 (2003) 494 – 507 Corporate governance in China: An overview Donald C. CLARKE * University of Washington School of Law, Willia...
A review of corporate governance in China 《经济研究》 2012年第11期 Social Indicators Research,Springer 2012.9 《江西社会科学》 2012年第8期 《经济管理》...
Review on researches o... 暂无评价 5页 2.00 Corporate governance a....because of the low levels of corporate governance in China's listed firms....
A Review of Corporate ... 33页 4下载券 喜欢此文档的还喜欢 ENVIRONMENTAL ...Environmental Governance in China Return to Event List December 17 2002, ...
热门文档