文档下载 文档下载导航
设为首页 | 加入收藏
搜索 请输入内容:  
 导航当前位置: 文档下载 > 所有分类 > 工程科技 > 机械/仪表 > A Review of Corporate Governance in China
侵权投诉

A Review of Corporate Governance in China

and confirm the limited protection of minority rights and highly concentrated ownership in Asia. Firms are normally controlled by one or more shareholders, thus the separation of management from ownership is rare and family controlled corporations are prevalent in East Asian countries. For example, the largest ten families control half of the total value of listed corporate assets in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand (Claessens et al. 2000). Traditionally, some large Korean business groups (Chaebols), such as Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo, were also family based (Ehrlich and Kang, 1999). In China, listed corporations are normally controlled by State and financial institutions, and tradable A-shares accounts for only a small part of total shares outstanding (Li and Naughton, 2007). Another interesting phenomenon in Asian countries is a pyramid ownership structure, which is defined as owning a controlling holding of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a controlling interest in another, a process that can be repeated a number of times (Claessens et al. 2000). This raises some important questions. Why is ownership concentration more prevalent in East Asian countries? And why is significant corporate wealth in East Asia concentrated among a few families? Generally speaking, block ownership is attractive to blockholders when they can attain private benefits from controlling the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, investors may feel confident that their benefits are well protected through block shareholdings, especially in some countries without well functioning investor protection law and effective enforcement (La Porta et al., 1999).

Corporate governance issues have come to the fore in China particularly since the late 1970s, because the development of the corporate governance system is recognized as a vital component of the restructuring of SOEs. Before the economic reforms, Chinese industry was dominated by state ownership, and SOEs were the major economic contributors. Managers in SOEs were required to fulfil the production plans specified by the government rather than maximize the investment returns for the only investor — the state. The governance structure of SOEs was an integral part of the general government framework. At that time, SOEs were characterized by low productivity and efficiency, high input and low output.

5

上一页第5页

你可能喜欢

热门文档

相关文档

站点地图 | 文档上传 | 侵权投诉 | 手机版
本站所有资源均来自互联网,本站只负责收集和整理,均不承担任何法律责任,如有侵权等其它行为请联系我们.
文档下载 Copyright 2013 doc.guandang.net All Rights Reserved.  -  email