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A Review of Corporate Governance in China

common-law system, such as in US, UK and commonwealth countries (La Porta et al. 1998). In non common-law countries, legal protection for investor interests is typically vested with concentrated, rather than diffuse ownership (Gul and Zhao, 2000).

Generally speaking, corporate governance has been classified into two major categories: internal and external governance (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Gillan, 2006). Internal governance normally includes features of boards of directors, ownership and control, and managerial incentive mechanisms. On the other hand, external governance covers issues relate to the external market and government policies and regulations (Gillan, 2006). Denis and McConnell (2003) provide an excellent summary of corporate governance research. They posit that there are two major generations of corporate governance research. The first research generation focused on the internal governance mechanism, and tried to determine whether these internal mechanises, such as board of directors, executive compensation and ownership and control, affect firm performance in individual countries. The second generation is more likely to consider the influence from external forces, such as market and legal and regulatory issues, on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance around the world. The research of the second generation begins with the work of La Porta et al. (1998). Researchers now pay more attention to the relationship between the legal system and corporate governance mechanisms.

Recently, corporate governance has received much attention in Asia, particularly after the 1997 Asia financial crisis. Johnson et al. (2000) point out that poor corporate governance had a significant effect on the extent of currency deprecations and stock market declines in the Asian crisis. Their findings indicate that countries with weak legal protection of shareholder rights and poor enforcement were more susceptible to a fall in asset values and a collapse of the exchange rate. Eiteman et al. (2001) also support the notion that a weak corporate governance system was one of the major causes of the Asian financial crisis. The importance of legal protection to creditors and minority shareholders is also emphasized by La Porta et al. (1997).

Claessens and Fan (2002) provide a comprehensive corporate governance review in Asia 4

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