significantly related to the return on assets, more so than for stock returns. In addition, firms with foreign shareholders tend to pay more to CEOs than firms controlled by the state. The explanation might be that foreign shareholders want to have the best available managers in the market and so the remuneration is higher. However, Liu and Otsuka (2004) argue that the new reward system has not brought the expected improvements in productivity. Mengistae and Xu (2004) conclude that little evidence of performance and compensation relationship has been found in their study. In addition, Firth et al. (2006) find that on average the sensitivity of pay to performance is low, and this raises questions about the effectiveness of incentive systems in China. These mixed results provide inconclusive evidence of the role of compensation in China.
3.2 External Governance
3.2.1 External Market
The literature on the market for corporate control indicates that external markets are important for facilitating mergers and takeovers of listed companies. In this context, well-functioning regulations and laws protect the benefits of investors, particularly small investors. Under this situation, it can be argued that high product market competition is the most powerful force toward economic efficiency. In the long-term, product market competition can force companies to minimize costs, upgrade technology and form suitable corporate structures to fit the needs of market (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In a market which facilitates the market for corporate control, the share ownership is widely dispersed. Therefore, the shareholder influence on management is weak. Unsatisfactory performance is often disciplined by shareholders selling and by subsequent takeovers.
However, takeover activity and an active external market are not always a component of the governance mechanisms around the world. China is a typical example. As mentioned before, free market style mergers and acquisitions are not allowed in China. In April 2005, the Chinese authorities announced the gradual floating of non-tradable state owned shares for all domestically listed companies. All listed companies are required to propose a reform plan to transfer the status of non-tradable shares and to develop a compensation package for existing tradable shareholders comprising flexible combinations of cash, 12
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