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A Review of Corporate Governance in China

Normally managers receive their compensation in four ways in developed countries: salary, bonuses, perquisites and stock-based incentives. Tirole (2006) finds that the sensitivity of payment to performance has increased significantly since the early 1980s, and that stock options are becoming the most prevalent component of CEO compensation in the U.S. The evidence from other developed economies on this issue generally supports the U.S. evidence (Bryan et al., 2002).

Before the economic reforms began in the late 1970s, SOEs managers were paid based on a highly structured payment scale system. The state tightly controlled the major activities of SOEs, and all profits made by corporations were absorbed into the state budget and the state reallocated them wherever they saw fit (Shen, 1993). Managers of SOEs acted as government representatives and were paid based on their rank within the payment scale system. In the other words, there was no incentive system to motivate managers to maximise the financial performance of the firm. However, the payment system has undergone dramatically changes since the late 1970s.

Management compensation in Chinese listed firms is now determined by the board of directors. In the early 1990s, more incentive motivated reward systems were introduced to SOEs. The most popular system was that the CEO’s compensation was made up of a cash salary and a performance bonus (Firth et al., 2006). However, the bonus payment system was not sufficiently flexible in practice. One of the major reasons was that the method of bonus payment was not clearly defined, and the formulae used in determining bonuses were not disclosed. Recently, listed Chinese firms have been encouraged to adopt a more practical approach to solve this problem, which is more performance related. It is worth noting that very few Chinese firms have executive stock option schemes.

There is a developing body of work regarding performance based approaches. Kato and Long (2006) find a significant relationship between the top executives’ compensation and shareholders’ value in China. Meanwhile, the sales growth rate also has significant relationship to executive compensation. Rui et al. (2002) find that CEO compensation is 11

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