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Chapter 2 GAME THEORY IN SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS

Abstract Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines game-theoretic concepts t

GameTheoryinSupplyChainAnalysis9

Indeed,itispossibletheoutcomeisnotevenanequilibriumbecause

theplayersmaychoosestrategiesfromdi erentequilibria.Forexam-

ple,considerthenormalformgameinFigure2.1.TherearetwoNash

equilibriainthatgame{Left,Up}and{Right,Down}:eachisabest

responsetotheotherplayer’sstrategy.However,becausetheplayers

choosetheirstrategiessimultaneouslyitispossiblethatplayerIchooses

Right(the2ndequilibrium)whileplayerIIchooseUp(the1stequilib-

rium),whichresultsin{Right,Up},theworstoutcomeforbothplayers.

Insomesituationsitispossibletorationalizeawaysomeequilibriavia

are nementoftheNEconcept:e.g.,tremblinghandperfectequilibrium

bySelten(1975),sequentialequilibriumbyKrepsandWilson(1982)

andproperequilibriabyMyerson(1997).Thesere nementseliminate

equilibriathatarebasedonnon-crediblethreats,i.e.,threatsoffuture

actionsthatwouldnotactuallybeadoptedifthesequenceofeventsin

thegameledtoapointinthegameinwhichthoseactionscouldbe

taken.TheextensiveformgameinFigure2.1illustratesthispoint.

{Left,Up}isaNashequilibrium(justasitisinthecomparablenormalformgame)becauseeachplayerischoosingabestresponsetotheother

player’sstrategy:LeftisoptimalforplayerIgivenplayerIIplansto

playUpandplayerIIisindi erentbetweenUporDowngivenplayerI

choosesLeft.ButifplayerIweretochooseRight,thenitisunreason-

abletoassumeplayerIIwouldactuallyfollowthroughwithUP:UP

yieldsapayo of0whileDownyieldsapayo of2.Hence,the{Left,

Up}equilibriumissupportedbyanon-crediblethreatbyplayerIIto

playUp.Althoughthesere nementsareviewedasextremelyimpor-

tantineconomics(SeltenwasawardedtheNobelprizeforhiswork),the

needforthesere nementshasnotyetmaterializedintheSCMlitera-

ture.Butthatmaychangeasmoreworkisdoneonsequential/dynamic

games.

AninterestingfeatureoftheNEconceptisthatthesystemoptimal

solution(i.e.,asolutionthatmaximizesthesumofplayers’payo s)need

notbeaNE.Hence,decentralizeddecisionmakinggenerallyintroduces

ine ciencyinthesupplychain.Thereare,however,someexceptions:

seeMahajanandvanRyzin(1999b)andNetessineandZhang(2003)

forsituationsinwhichcompetitionmayresultinthesystem-optimal

performance.Infact,aNEmaynotevenbeontheParetofrontier:the

setofstrategiessuchthateachplayercanbemadebettero onlyifsome

otherplayerismadeworseo .AsetofstrategiesisParetooptimalif

theyareontheParetofrontier;otherwiseasetofstrategiesisPareto

inferior.Hence,aNEcanbeParetoinferior.ThePrisoner’sDilemma

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