Abstract Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines game-theoretic concepts t
GameTheoryinSupplyChainAnalysis9
Indeed,itispossibletheoutcomeisnotevenanequilibriumbecause
theplayersmaychoosestrategiesfromdi erentequilibria.Forexam-
ple,considerthenormalformgameinFigure2.1.TherearetwoNash
equilibriainthatgame{Left,Up}and{Right,Down}:eachisabest
responsetotheotherplayer’sstrategy.However,becausetheplayers
choosetheirstrategiessimultaneouslyitispossiblethatplayerIchooses
Right(the2ndequilibrium)whileplayerIIchooseUp(the1stequilib-
rium),whichresultsin{Right,Up},theworstoutcomeforbothplayers.
Insomesituationsitispossibletorationalizeawaysomeequilibriavia
are nementoftheNEconcept:e.g.,tremblinghandperfectequilibrium
bySelten(1975),sequentialequilibriumbyKrepsandWilson(1982)
andproperequilibriabyMyerson(1997).Thesere nementseliminate
equilibriathatarebasedonnon-crediblethreats,i.e.,threatsoffuture
actionsthatwouldnotactuallybeadoptedifthesequenceofeventsin
thegameledtoapointinthegameinwhichthoseactionscouldbe
taken.TheextensiveformgameinFigure2.1illustratesthispoint.
{Left,Up}isaNashequilibrium(justasitisinthecomparablenormalformgame)becauseeachplayerischoosingabestresponsetotheother
player’sstrategy:LeftisoptimalforplayerIgivenplayerIIplansto
playUpandplayerIIisindi erentbetweenUporDowngivenplayerI
choosesLeft.ButifplayerIweretochooseRight,thenitisunreason-
abletoassumeplayerIIwouldactuallyfollowthroughwithUP:UP
yieldsapayo of0whileDownyieldsapayo of2.Hence,the{Left,
Up}equilibriumissupportedbyanon-crediblethreatbyplayerIIto
playUp.Althoughthesere nementsareviewedasextremelyimpor-
tantineconomics(SeltenwasawardedtheNobelprizeforhiswork),the
needforthesere nementshasnotyetmaterializedintheSCMlitera-
ture.Butthatmaychangeasmoreworkisdoneonsequential/dynamic
games.
AninterestingfeatureoftheNEconceptisthatthesystemoptimal
solution(i.e.,asolutionthatmaximizesthesumofplayers’payo s)need
notbeaNE.Hence,decentralizeddecisionmakinggenerallyintroduces
ine ciencyinthesupplychain.Thereare,however,someexceptions:
seeMahajanandvanRyzin(1999b)andNetessineandZhang(2003)
forsituationsinwhichcompetitionmayresultinthesystem-optimal
performance.Infact,aNEmaynotevenbeontheParetofrontier:the
setofstrategiessuchthateachplayercanbemadebettero onlyifsome
otherplayerismadeworseo .AsetofstrategiesisParetooptimalif
theyareontheParetofrontier;otherwiseasetofstrategiesisPareto
inferior.Hence,aNEcanbeParetoinferior.ThePrisoner’sDilemma
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