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Chapter 2 GAME THEORY IN SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS

Abstract Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines game-theoretic concepts t

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Definition4.Mappingf(x),Rn→Rnisacontractioni kf(x1) f(x2)k≤αkx1 x2k, x1,x2,α<1.

Inwords,theapplicationofacontractionmappingtoanytwopoints

strictlyreduces(i.e.,α=1doesnotwork)thedistancebetweenthese

points.Thenorminthede nitioncanbeanynorm,i.e.,themapping

canbeacontractioninonenormandnotacontractioninanothernorm.

Theorem4.Ifthebestresponsemappingisacontractiononthe

entirestrategyspace,thereisauniqueNEinthegame.

Onecanthinkofacontractionmappingintermsofiterativeplay:

player1selectssomestrategy,thenplayer2selectsastrategybasedon

thedecisionbyplayer1,etc.Ifthebestresponsemappingisacontrac-

tion,theNEobtainedasaresultofsuchiterativeplayisstablebutthe

oppositeisnotnecessarilytrue,i.e.,nomatterwherethegamestarts,

the naloutcomeisthesame.SeealsoMoulin(1986)foranextensive

treatmentofstableequilibria.

AmajorrestrictioninTheorem4isthatthecontractionmappingcon-

ditionmustbesatis edeverywhere.Thisassumptionisquiterestrictive

becausethebestresponsemappingmaybeacontractionlocally,sayin

somenotnecessarilysmallε neighborhoodoftheequilibriumbutnot

outsideofit.Hence,ifiterativeplaystartsinthisε neighborhood,

thenitconvergestotheequilibrium,butstartingoutsidethatneighbor-

hoodmaynotleadtotheequilibrium(eveniftheequilibriumisunique).

Eventhoughonemaywishtoarguethatitisreasonablefortheplayers

tostartiterativeplaysomeplaceclosetotheequilibrium,formalization

ofsuchanargumentisratherdi cult.Hence,wemustimposethecon-

ditionthattheentirestrategyspacebeconsidered.SeeStidham(1992)

foraninterestingdiscussionofstabilityissuesinaqueuingsystem.

WhileTheorem4isastartingpointtowardsamethodfordemon-

stratinguniqueness,itdoesnotactuallyexplainhowtovalidatethat

abestreplymappingisacontraction.Supposewehaveagamewith

nplayerseachendowedwiththestrategyxiandwehaveobtainedthe

bestresponsefunctionsforallplayers,xi=fi(x i).Wecanthende ne

thefollowingmatrixofderivativesofthebestresponsefunctions:

¯¯0¯ f¯2¯A=¯1

¯ ...¯fn1 f20... fn2............ fn f22...0¯¯¯¯¯.¯¯¯

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