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Chapter 2 GAME THEORY IN SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS

Abstract Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines game-theoretic concepts t

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isajumpdownandasmaller+εbecomestheglobalmaximum.

Forthistobethecase,itmustbethat

πix1i³x#j´x1i

xjx#j,x#j> πix2i xjx#j,x#j³,

´´or,inwords,theobjectivefunctionrisesfasterat

at³x2i

atleastsomewhereontheintervalwhichisacon-

tradiction.Hence,if 2πi/ xi xj>0holdsthenonlyjumpsupinthe

bestresponsearepossible.³x#j´,x#j´x1i.This,however,canonlyhappenifhx1i³x#j´,x2i³x#j´i#x#thanj,xj 2πi/ xi xj<0³

2.4Uniquenessofequilibrium

Fromtheperspectiveofgeneratingqualitativeinsights,itisquite

usefultohaveagamewithauniqueNE.Ifthereisonlyoneequilibrium,

thenonecancharacterizeequilibriumactionswithoutmuchambiguity.

Unfortunately,demonstratinguniquenessisgenerallymuchharderthan

demonstratingexistenceofequilibrium.Thissectionprovidesseveral

methodsforprovinguniqueness.Nosinglemethoddominates;allmay

havetobetriedto ndtheonethatworks.Furthermore,oneshouldbe

carefultorecognizethatthesemethodsassumeexistence,i.e.,existence

ofNEmustbeshownseparately.Finally,itisworthpointingoutthat

uniquenessresultsareonlyavailableforgameswithcontinuousbest

responsefunctionsandhencetherearenogeneralmethodstoprove

uniquenessofNEinsupermodulargames.

2.4.1Method1.Algebraicargument.Insomerather

fortunatesituationsonecanascertainthatthesolutionisuniqueby

simplylookingattheoptimalityconditions.Forexample,inatwo-

playergametheoptimalityconditionofoneoftheplayersmayhavea

uniqueclosed-formsolutionthatdoesnotdependontheotherplayer’s

strategyand,giventhesolutionforoneplayer,theoptimalitycondition

forthesecondplayercanbesolveduniquely.SeeHallandPorteus

(2000)andNetessineandRudi(2001)forexamples.Inothercasesone

canassureuniquenessbyanalyzinggeometricalpropertiesofthebest

responsefunctionsandarguingthattheyintersectonlyonce.Ofcourse,

thisisonlyfeasibleintwo-playergames.SeeParlar(1988)foraproof

ofuniquenessinthetwo-playernewsvendorgameandMajumderand

Groenevelt(2001b)forasupplychaingamewithcompetitioninreverse

logistics.However,inmostsituationsthesegeometricalpropertiesare

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