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Chapter 2 GAME THEORY IN SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS

Abstract Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines game-theoretic concepts t

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orderingoftheplayers’strategies.Lety= Qjsothat

2πi=rifDi+(Dj+y)+|Dj>Qj(Qi)Pr(Dj> y)>0,iandthegamebecomessupermodularin(xi,y)soexistenceofNEis

assured.Noticethatwedonotchangeeitherpayo sorthestructure

ofthegame,weonlyaltertheorderingofoneplayer’sstrategyspace.

Obviously,thistrickonlyworksintwo-playergames,seealsoLippman

andMcCardle(1997)fortheanalysisofthemoregeneralversionofthe

newsvendorgameusingasimilartransformation.Hence,wecanstate

thatingeneralNEexistsingameswithdecreasingbestresponses(sub-

modulargames)withtwoplayers.Thisargumentcanbegeneralized

slightlyintwowaysthatwementionbrie y,seeVives(1999)fordetails.

Onewayistoconsiderann playergamewherebestresponsesarefunc-³P´ tionsofaggregateactionsofallotherplayers,thatis,xi=xij=ixj.

Ifbestresponsesinsuchagamearedecreasing,thenNEexists.³PAnother´ generalizationistoconsiderthesamegamewithxi=xij=ixjbut

requiresymmetry.Insuchagame,existencecanbeshownevenwith

non-monotonebestresponsesprovidedthatthereareonlyjumpsupbut

onintervalsbetweenjumpsbestresponsescanbeincreasingordecreas-

ing.

Wenowstepbacktodiscusstheintuitionbehindthesupermodular-

ityresults.Roughlyspeaking,Tarski’s xedpointtheoremonlyrequires

bestresponsemappingstobenon-decreasingfortheexistenceofequi-

libriumanddoesnotrequirequasi-concavityoftheplayers’payo sand

allowsforjumpsinbestresponses.Whileitmaybehardtobelievethat

non-decreasingbestresponsesistheonlyrequirementfortheexistence

ofaNE,consideronceagainthesimplestformofasingle-dimensional

equilibriumasasolutiontothe xedpointmappingx=f(x)onthe

compactset.Itiseasytoverifyafterafewattemptsthatiff(x)is

non-decreasingbutpossiblywithjumpsupthenitisnotpossibleto

deriveasituationwithoutanequilibrium.However,whenf(x)jumps

down,non-existenceispossible(seeFigure2.6).

Hence,increasingbestresponsefunctionsistheonlymajorrequire-

mentforanequilibriumtoexist;players’objectivesdonothavetobe

quasi-concaveorevencontinuous.However,todescribeanexistence

theoremwithnon-continuouspayo srequirestheintroductionofterms

andde nitionsfromlatticetheory.Asaresult,werestrictedourselves

totheassumptionofcontinuouspayo functions,andinparticular,to

twice-di erentiablepayo functions.

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