Abstract Game theory has become an essential tool in the analysis of supply chains with multiple agents, often with conflicting objectives. This chapter surveys the applications of game theory to supply chain analysis and outlines game-theoretic concepts t
14
orderingoftheplayers’strategies.Lety= Qjsothat
2πi=rifDi+(Dj+y)+|Dj>Qj(Qi)Pr(Dj> y)>0,iandthegamebecomessupermodularin(xi,y)soexistenceofNEis
assured.Noticethatwedonotchangeeitherpayo sorthestructure
ofthegame,weonlyaltertheorderingofoneplayer’sstrategyspace.
Obviously,thistrickonlyworksintwo-playergames,seealsoLippman
andMcCardle(1997)fortheanalysisofthemoregeneralversionofthe
newsvendorgameusingasimilartransformation.Hence,wecanstate
thatingeneralNEexistsingameswithdecreasingbestresponses(sub-
modulargames)withtwoplayers.Thisargumentcanbegeneralized
slightlyintwowaysthatwementionbrie y,seeVives(1999)fordetails.
Onewayistoconsiderann playergamewherebestresponsesarefunc-³P´ tionsofaggregateactionsofallotherplayers,thatis,xi=xij=ixj.
Ifbestresponsesinsuchagamearedecreasing,thenNEexists.³PAnother´ generalizationistoconsiderthesamegamewithxi=xij=ixjbut
requiresymmetry.Insuchagame,existencecanbeshownevenwith
non-monotonebestresponsesprovidedthatthereareonlyjumpsupbut
onintervalsbetweenjumpsbestresponsescanbeincreasingordecreas-
ing.
Wenowstepbacktodiscusstheintuitionbehindthesupermodular-
ityresults.Roughlyspeaking,Tarski’s xedpointtheoremonlyrequires
bestresponsemappingstobenon-decreasingfortheexistenceofequi-
libriumanddoesnotrequirequasi-concavityoftheplayers’payo sand
allowsforjumpsinbestresponses.Whileitmaybehardtobelievethat
non-decreasingbestresponsesistheonlyrequirementfortheexistence
ofaNE,consideronceagainthesimplestformofasingle-dimensional
equilibriumasasolutiontothe xedpointmappingx=f(x)onthe
compactset.Itiseasytoverifyafterafewattemptsthatiff(x)is
non-decreasingbutpossiblywithjumpsupthenitisnotpossibleto
deriveasituationwithoutanequilibrium.However,whenf(x)jumps
down,non-existenceispossible(seeFigure2.6).
Hence,increasingbestresponsefunctionsistheonlymajorrequire-
mentforanequilibriumtoexist;players’objectivesdonothavetobe
quasi-concaveorevencontinuous.However,todescribeanexistence
theoremwithnon-continuouspayo srequirestheintroductionofterms
andde nitionsfromlatticetheory.Asaresult,werestrictedourselves
totheassumptionofcontinuouspayo functions,andinparticular,to
twice-di erentiablepayo functions.
Supply chain analysis 6 April_专业资料。Dell管理供应商的资料... Game theory in Supply ... 55页 免费 Chapter 2 GAME THEORY ... 55页...
Chapter 2 GAME THEORY IN... 55页 免费 Scheduling and Due-Date ... 28页 免费 Chapter 17 of the book “... 32页 免费 mySAP_Supply_Chain_Manag....
Cost Allocation Based on Game Theory in Supply Chain Coordination_交通运输_工程科技_专业资料。2008 International Workshop on Modelling, Simulation and ...
Supply chain design an... 14页 免费 Construction supply ch... 12页 免费 Job Analysis-Supply Ch... 8页 2下载券 Game theory in Supply ... 55页...
Chapter 2 GAME THEORY ... 55页 免费 game.theory.in.supply... 暂无评价...GAME THEORETIC APPLICATIONS IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW1,2 Mingming...
Chapter 2 GAME THEORY IN... 55页 免费 Chapter 16 Information T... ... Supply Chain Management (3rd Edition) Chapter 13 Transportation in the ...
The Supply Chain Managem... 10页 免费 Supply chain design and ... 14页 免费 Job Analysis-Supply Chai... 8页 5财富值 Game theory in Supply Ch....
Chapter 2: International Supply Chain Management ? ? ? ? ? 2.1. ...Economic activity analysis and claim 国际物流系统网络 [源]工厂 工厂 [汇] ...
Supply chain analysis ... 4页 免费 Chapter_2_Inventory_Ma... 105页 3...orientation views negotiations between buyer and seller as a zero-sum game....
4. Increased efficiency in the transactions between supply chain partners 5.... Chapter 2 GAME THEORY ... 55页 免费 Chapter 2 Supply Chain... 暂无...
热门文档