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18. THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF
REGIONAL SUBSIDIES
18.1. Introduction
A striking features of OECD economies is the regularity with which
governments favour rural regions to an extent that seems far out of proportion with their population shares. The classic example is the subsidisation and protection of agriculture, but rural regions also often receive direct economic aid. In Western
Europe, for example, governments routinely subsidise industry in rural/poor regions. Some of this direct, taking the form of tax breaks and/or production subsidise, and some of it is indirect, taking the form of regional infrastructure such as roads, airports and industrial parks.
This chapter takes a first look at the political economy of regional subsidies.
While there are undoubtedly many, many explanations to be explored, we focus primarily on the story – put forth by Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami (2001) – that
emphasises political homogeneity of rural regions. In a nutshell, this line of reasoning asserts that rural populations are more homogenous politically, perhaps as a result of decades of self-selection in the face of massive rural-to-urban migration. Given this, politicians find that a given subsidy level will buy more votes when the subsidies are paid to rural-based firms. Or, using the terminology of Persson and Tabellini (2000), there are more swing voters in rural regions. The chapter also briefly considers two other explanations, legislative over representation, and legislative bargaining.
In addition to asking how geography affects politics, the chapter also explores
how politics affects economic geography. In particular, we revisit the impact of falling trade costs on the location industry in a model where regional subsidy are politically determined.
18.1.1 Organisation of the Chapter
We begin the analysis be presenting the footloose capital (FC) model of
Chapter 3 augmented to include subsidies and a political economy module that
endogenises the size and direction of such subsidies. The subsequent section uses this model to address questions such as: When voters are heterogeneous, which population subsets are most attractive to politicians? How does this translate in the implemented regional policy? What are the effects on the spatial equilibrium?
The following section considers a different channel that may account for the
disproportionate subsidies received by rural regions in many nations. The legislature in many nations, the US being a prime example, are based on geographic as well as demographic principles. As a consequence, the number of legislative votes per citizen can vary enormously; both Montana and California have two US senators even though California’s population is many times that of Montana. This section, section 18.4,
considers how the design of constituencies shapes the spatial allocation of firms in the political equilibrium.
The last substantive section, section 18.5, focuses on a third channel linking
regions, political outcomes and industrial location. If the sole conflict of interest in a
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