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国有企业激励机制改革研究——从多任务委托代理的角度

ABSTRACT

Consideringtheimportanceandtherecenttheoreticalresearchinthestate—ownedenterprise’sstmcturerefo姗,itisobViouslythatthestate-ownedenterprisesalwaysactasthemainstaysofnationaldomesticeconomy,thisnotonlybecauseofitssymb01icsignificance,butalsobecauseofitsprominente髓cts

Thoughineconomicdevelopmentsandprofoundinnuncesinsocialchangesthestmctureref0珊of

yearsstate—ownedente印risesinsolVedtheproblemChinawhichunde唱osnearlythirtyhasaboutinef:f'ective

operationstepbystep,westillneedtoface

relationshipwithsoⅡleanewpuzzleofPrincipal—AgentrightsseparationbetweentheownersandmanagerSinthestate—ownedente印rises

Thisarticlestartswiththeanalysisofsomeopinionswhich

toarerelatedmedebateaboutstate—ownedente甲fise’sefficiency.Anerthat,wewillgettotheexplanationsofPrincipal—AgemtheoryarIdrelevantproblems.Based

canontheMulti taskPrincipal—AgentModel,weanalyzethereasonthat1ead

tothoseintemalPrincipal-Agcntproblemsinstate—ownedenterprises,thenit

awillbef0110wedwiththeprobiIlgofhowtoesIablishing

mechanismaccordingtothemeasuresoundincenCivedimcultyofenterprise’sperformance.Keyword:MultmskPrincipal-Agent,state-ownedEnte印rise,Perfomance,Ownership,IncentiveMechanism.

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