JournalofBusinessResearch64(2011)904–910
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
JournalofBusinessResearch
Topmanagementteamturnover,CEOsuccessiontype,andstrategicchange
JohnM.Barrona,DmitriyV.Chulkovb, ,GlenR.Waddellc
abc
DepartmentofEconomics,PurdueUniversity,WestLafayette,IN47907-1310,UnitedStatesSchoolofBusiness,IndianaUniversityKokomo,Kokomo,IN46904-9003,UnitedStates
DepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofOregon,Eugene,OR97403-1285,UnitedStatesandIZABonn,Germany
articleinfoabstract
WhilepreviousresearchsuggeststhatCEOturnovercorrelateswithstrategicchangesin rm'soperationssuchasdiscontinuationofoperations,wedemonstratethatsuch ndingsapplyonlytospeci ctypesofCEOturnover,andonlyifnon-CEOmembersofthetopmanagementteamalsoexitthe rm.Ouranalysisexaminescasesofcontender,follower,andoutsidersuccessionandreinforcesthekeyroleofnon-CEOdeparturesinstrategicchangeata rm.Theresultssupportanintegrationoftheupperechelonsperspectiveandthepowercirculationtheoryviewoftopmanagementteamturnover.
©2010ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.
Articlehistory:
Received3April2009
Accepted1September2010
Availableonline28September2010Keywords:
Executiveturnover
TopmanagementteamsStrategicchange
DiscontinuedoperationsPowercirculationtheory
1.Introduction
Researchontopmanagementteams(TMTs)recognizesthatseniorexecutivesrarelyworkalone.Theupperechelonsperspective(HambrickandMason,1984)arguesthatcollectivecharacteristicsandactionsoftheTMTmayaffectorganizationaloutcomes.However,studiesofexecutiveturnoverineconomicsand nancetypicallypayexclusiveattentiontotheCEOand rmperformancemeasures(e.g.MurphyandZimmerman,1993;Warneretal.,1988;Pourciau,1993;Husonetal.,2004).Lessresearchinthisliteraturefocusesonstrategicchangesatthe rmcoincidingwithCEOturnover.Inoneexample,Weisbach(1995)explorestheextenttowhichCEOturnovercorrelateswiththedivestituresofrecentlyacquireddivisionsandconcludesthattheprobabilityofexitingalineofbusinessanddivestingunsuccessfulacquisitionsissigni cantlyhigherwiththedismissaloftheCEOresponsiblefortheacquisition.
Inordertocomplementtheresearchonstrategicchangesatthetimeoftopmanagementturnover,ouranalysisexploitsalargerepresentativedatasetthatallowsustobetteridentifythespeci ctypesofCEOturnoverthatcorrelatewithchangesatthe rm,includingjointturnoveroftheCEOandnon-CEOmembersoftheTMT.Weusetheaccountingdisclosureofdiscontinuedoperations–exitingalineofbusiness–asameasureofstrategicchangein rmoperations.Suchavariablehasbeenusedpreviouslyinstudiesofescalationinmanagerialdecisions(StatmanandSepe,1989)andissimilarin avortothevariableconsideredbyWeisbach(1995).Ouranalysishelps
Correspondingauthor.Tel.:+17654559282.
E-mailaddresses:barron@purdue.edu(J.M.Barron),dchulkov@iuk.edu(D.V.Chulkov),waddell@uoregon.edu(G.R.

Waddell).
0148-2963/$–seefrontmatter©2010ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.doi:

10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.09.004
revealamorefocusedrelationshipthanhasbeenpreviouslydocumented.
ShenandCannella(2002)adaptthepowercirculationtheoryofcontrol(Ocasio,1994;OcasioandKim,1999)tothediscussionofTMTturnover.Inthisview,therearethreedistincttypesofCEOturnover—outsidersuccession,followersuccessionthatincludesinsiderCEOreplacementappointedafteraretirementoftheoutgoingCEO,andcontendersuccessionthatincludesinsidersuccessorsappointedaftertheresignationoftheoutgoingCEO.ShenandCannellademonstratethatthesethreetypesofsuccessionhavedifferenteffectsonthesubsequentoperationalperformanceofthe rm.Wecomplementthisstrandofresearchbyexploringamoreprecisemeasureofstrategicchangeintheoperationsof rmsaffectedbythethreetypesofCEOsuccession.WealsointegratethethreetypesofturnoversuggestedbyShenandCannellawiththeupperechelonsperspectivebyexaminingTMTturnoverscenariosatthetimeofCEOsuccession.Ouranalysisleadstothreesigni cant ndings.
Our rst ndingisthatCEOdeparturefromthe rmisassociatedwithreportingofdiscontinuedoperationsonlyifothertopexecutivesalsoexitthe rm.NotethatlimitingtheanalysistoonlycasesofCEOturnoverwascommoninearlierempiricalstudiesinthe nanceandeconomicsliterature(e.g.Weisbach,1995;Husonetal.,2004).Wereplicatethebasic ndingofWeisbachthatCEOturnoveriscorrelatedwithchangesinthe rm'soperations.Infurtheranalysis,weallowestimatestodifferincasesofjointturnoverbytheCEOandothertopmanagersandincaseswhentheCEOleavesalone.Doingsodemonstratesthatthebasicresultre ectsalargeandsigni cantlinkbetweendiscontinuedoperationsandCEOdeparturesthatalsoinvolvedeparturesofotherTMTmembers.This ndingsupportstheupperechelonsperspectiveandquestionsthemeritoftheorizing
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