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Inflation Bias

Topic one: Inflation Bias and the Problem of Time Inconsistency

The twentieth century has been characterized by positive inflation rates in most countries during most time periods. The by now standard explanation for this bias is based on a two-way interaction between policymakers and a rational public within the context of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. It is based on the notion that monetary policymakers care about both price stability and employment and that their preferred level of employment is higher than the natural level. This is due to either tax distortions or the existence of unions that create excessive unemployment by maintaining the real wage above its market clearing level. Under discretion policymakers try to create inflation surprises in order to push employment above its natural level towards the higher desired level. But individuals understand the temptation of policymakers and correctly forecast inflation, neutralizing any effect of inflation on employment. As a consequence employment remains at its natural level but monetary policy is subject to a suboptimal inflation bias. This is the well-known dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy under discretion.

Therefore, we argue that the positive average rates of inflation in the real world are based on the problem of time inconsistent. A broad range of policies are time inconsistent: policies that appear optimal today are not optimal later on, especially after agents have adjusted their behaviour accordingly. If a course of action is time inconsistent, it is not credible, because the private sector will not consider it likely to be implemented. What is left is always less desirable.

Basically, there are two ways of making time inconsistent policies credible: legally binding rules and reputation. Rules invariable restrict policy discretion and activism. Reputation requires that governments refrain from actions even if they are, at the time, desirable. In the following context, we discuss some solutions particularly based on the inflation bias problem.

1. One potential solution to an inflationary bias is to force the central bank to bear some cost if it deviates from its announced policy of low inflation, thereby raising the marginal cost of inflation as perceived by the central bank.

1.1 One form such a cost might take is a lost reputation. The central bank might, perhaps through its past behavior, demonstrate that it will deliver zero inflation despite the apparent incentive to inflate. If the central bank then deviates from the low inflation solution, its credibility is lost and the public expects high inflation in the future. That is, the public employs a trigger strategy.

1.2 An alternative approach is to consider situations in which the public may be uncertain about the true preferences of the central bank. In the resulting imperfect information game, the public’s expectations concerning inflation must be based on its beliefs about the central bank’s preferences or type. Based on observed outcomes,

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