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2008Analysis of Packet Relaying Models and Incentive Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks with Gam

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22nd International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications

Analysis of packet relaying models and incentive strategies in wireless ad hoc

networks with game theory

Lu Yan, Stephen Hailes, Licia Capra

University College London, Dept. of Computer Science

Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK

Abstract

In wireless ad hoc networks, nodes are both routers and terminals, and they have to cooperate to communicate. Cooperation at the network layer means routing (finding a path for a packet), and forwarding (relaying packets for others). However, because wireless nodes are usually constrained by limited power and computational resources, a selfish node may be unwilling to spend its resources in forwarding packets that are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to forward its packets to the destination. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to facilitate the study of the non-cooperative behaviors in wireless ad hoc networks and analyze incentive schemes to motivate cooperation among wireless ad hoc network nodes to achieve a mutually beneficial networking result.

Since wireless nodes are usually constrained by limited power and computational resources, a selfish node may be unwilling to spend its resources in forwarding packets which are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to forward its packets to the destination. This is particularly true in typical wireless sensor network nodes [4], where battery-power is a scarce resource and forwarding is an energy-consuming network activity that will shorten a node’s lifetime. Even in an ideal case in which nodes have no power and computational constraints, forwarding packets consumes a portion of bandwidth and processing time available to the forwarding nodes. Thus, the forwarding cost is not zero; a reasonable move for a node which does not belong to a central authority is to drop the packets belonging to any other node but itself, i.e., to act selfishly. In the worst case, assuming every node is selfish, this behavior will have a collective effect to bring down the communication mechanism of the whole ad hoc network, and result to a tragedy-of-the-commons [5].

1. Introduction

In a wireless ad hoc network, intermediate nodes on a communication path are expected to forward packets of other nodes so that nodes can communicate beyond their wireless transmission range. Typical examples of the wireless ad hoc networks include military communication or emergency response scenarios, where all participating nodes belong to the same authority, share a common goal, and are therefore motivated to act cooperatively to provide network services [1]. However, since wireless ad hoc networks are increasingly deployed in daily life scenarios such as inter-vehicle communication [2] and Internet access for remote areas [3], the participating nodes most unlikely belong to a single authority and no longer share a common goal any more. Cooperation in such networks cannot be assumed since it has been commonly accepted that network nodes in the above scenarios have the freedom to make decisions in their own best interests.

2. Related work

Non-cooperative issues in ad hoc networks have drawn considerable attention over the past few years, and it has been shown that the presence of selfish nodes degrades the overall performance of a non-cooperative ad hoc network [6].

Ideally, incentives should be provided to motivate cooperation among wireless ad hoc network nodes to achieve a mutually beneficial networking result. In essence, participating nodes should be rewarded for cooperative behaviors and be punished for non-cooperative behaviors. The incentive schemes for packet forwarding in the literature basically fall into two categories, namely, trust-based schemes and price-based schemes.

Trust-based schemes use trustworthiness and reputation information in routing to enforce the

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