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Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

The Journal of China Universities of Posts and Telecommunications

September 2008, 15(3): 51–58

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

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Packet track and traceback mechanism against denial of service attacks

LI Li, SHEN Su-bin

Institute of Information Network Technology, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China

Abstract

The denial of service attack is a main type of threat on the Internet today. On the basis of path identification (Pi) and Internetcontrol message protocol (ICMP) traceback (iTrace) methods, a packet track and traceback mechanism is proposed, which features rapid response and high accuracy. In this scheme, routers apply packet marking scheme and send traceback messages, which enables the victim to design the path tree in peace time. During attack times the victim can trace attackers back within the path tree and perform rapid packet filtering using the marking in each packet. Traceback messages overcome Pi’s limitation, wherein too much path information is lost in path identifiers; whereas path identifiers can be used to expedite the design of the path-tree, which reduces the high overhead in iTrace. Therefore, our scheme not only synthesizes the advantages but also compromises the disadvantages of the above two methods. Simulation results with NS-2 show the validity of our scheme.

Keywords denial of service (DoS) attack, traceback, packet marking, Pi

1 Introduction

The DoS attack is a main threat to the Internet. In flooding-style DoS attacks, the attacker sends large amount of packets to a single victim, exhausting the victim’s communication or computing resources in a short time. Even worse, the attacker often hides his true identity with various means such as spoofing, which complicates the attack. As a variation of DoS attack, the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is more destructive, in which multiple compromised machines send large numbers of packets to the victim. For example, in February 2000, several high-profit sites including Yahoo, eBay, and Amazon were brought down for hours by DDoS attacks, wherein they were flooded by tens of thousands of legal connections which made servers inaccessible [1].

Many researchers have studied countermeasures. A common solution is the IP traceback technique, whose principle is to redesign the path that the packets take from the attacker through the Internet to the victim. With knowledge of attack paths, defenders can take measures upstream from the victim, e.g., filter attack packets before they reach the victim. Some nice analysis of IP traceback technique can be found in Refs. [2, 3]. In DDoS attacks, the number of attack paths is far beyond that in DoS attacks, where redesigning thousands

Received date: 08-09-2007

Corresponding author: LI Li, E-mail: lli@njupt.edu.cn

of paths would cripple the performance of this technique. For example, the experiment results in Ref. [4] show that fragment marking scheme (FMS) proposed by Savage et al. has a very high computation overhead for the victim to redesign the attack paths and gives a large number of false positives when the attack originates from multiple attackers. Therefore, IP traceback is not that practical in DDoS attacks. Yaar et al. [5] argued that redesigning the exact path is not that necessary in defending against a DDoS attack. They proposed Pi mechanism, in which each packet takes an identifier as an indication of the particular path that the packet takes, making it possible to isolate and discard packets from different paths. This scheme has many benefits compared with IP traceback. IP traceback technique can maintain high accuracy at the price of complexity, time or large-scale deployment. For example, probabilistic packet marking (PPM) scheme [6] needs to collect large numbers of packets before it is able to redesign the path; the device logging method [7] demands close cooperation among routers. In contrast, Pi is light-weight because it imposes slight computation and storage overhead on routers and the victim, it is simple and feasible in deployment because it does not require any cooperation between routers, and it is rapid in responsiveness because the decision can be made on a single-packet basis. However, there are still several disadvantages in the current design that limit its use. One is that the path identifier can not be guaranteed to be globally unique; there are collisions among identifiers of

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