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1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

388

L.G. Epstein and S. E. Zm.‘First-order’ risk aversion

over a broad range of gamble sizes. The common constant-relative-risk-averse, expected utility function fails in this respect, as pointed out by Kandel and Stambaugh (19891, for example. In this paper we describe an alternative nonexpected utility functional form for risk preferences that is better able to satisfy the above desideratum, while retaining the constancy of the degree of relative risk aversion and the tractability which that constancy affords. Then we examine the extent to which the new functional form helps to resolve the equity premium puzzle posed by Mehra and Prescott (19851. Mehra and Prescott argue that the representative agent, expected additive utility model, sensibly restricted, cannot account for both the 0.8 percent average real return on debt and the nearly 7.0 p

ercent average real return on equity that the U.S. data show for the 1889-1978 period. The qualification‘sensibly restricted’ is essential for the existence of a puzzle. For example, as the authors describe (p. 154), with a sufficiently large degree of relative risk aversion‘virtually any pair of average equity and risk-free returns can be obtained by making small changes in the process on consumption’. In related modelling exercises, a number of authors have shown that with a degree of relative risk aversion in the 20-30 range, the representative agent model performs fairly well[see, for example, Grossman, Melino, and Shiller (19871, Kandel and Stambaugh (19891, and Cecchetti and Mark (199011. On the other hand, as shown by Kocherlakota (19881, allowing negative time preference aIso helps the model to match the above historical averages. To some extent what is‘sensible’ or‘plausible’ is subject to personal judgement, though as advocated by Mehra and Prescott, evidence from other areas can and should be brought to bear upon the choice of parameter values. In this paper we maintain the common assumption of positive discounting of the future, an assumption which needs no defense here. Our specification of risk preferences, which is where we deviate from the standard model, is appealing on two grounds. First, as previously described, for the same parameter values, our specification implies a degree of risk aversion for a broad range of gambles that is plausible on introspective grounds. Second, our model of risk preferences can explain evidence, such as Allais-type behavior, which contradicts expected utility theory, thereby providing a uniting framework for organizing observations of individual behavior in the laboratory and data on aggregate market behavior. Following Epstein and Zin (19891 and Weil (19901, we assume that intertemporal utility is recursive thus permitting the notions of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability to be partially disentangled[see also Epstein (1988)]. Roughly speaking, recursive utility specifications have two components, corresponding to certainty preferences (substitution) and risk preferences, respectively. An integral part of our model is the assumption that risk preferences exhibit‘first-order’ risk aversion in the sense recently defined by Segal and Spivak (1990). In an expected utility model of choice

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

1990_First-order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle_Larry G.Epstein and Stanley E. Zin

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