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heathcott - pruitt-igoe & critique of public housing

heathcott - pruitt-igoe & critique of public housing

Pruitt-Igoe and the Critique of Public Housing

Joseph Heathcott, The New School

E

ven before the 1973 implosion that brought one of the Pruitt-Igoe tower blocks crashing to the ground, scholars, journalists, and activists began to use the project as a lens through which to lter a range of narratives about public housing (Bristol, 1991; Com-erio, 1981). Some saw in Pruitt-Igoe a story of good intentions gone awry (Rainwater, 1967, 1970), while others concluded that public housing constituted a programmed failure (Meehan, 1979). For many observers, the tenant selection process was to blame, saddling high-rise projects with families that supposedly lacked the urban skills necessary to live in such environments (Moore, 1969; Schmandt & Wendell, 1976). For others, high-rise projects deteriorated because their design precluded the direct, close-to-ground surveillance necessary for prevent-ing crime and promoting security (Newman, 1972). Most critics found in Pruitt-Igoe a cautionary tale about the hubris of liberalism, the shortcomings of the welfare state, or the failure of modern architecture and planning (Bailey, 1965; Blake, 1977; Jencks, 1977; Wolfe, 1981).

The accounts of high-rise public housing that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s sought narrow causes largely from within the opera-tions of the program, whether from bad policy, inept management, weak design, poor construction, or ungovernable tenants (Bristol, 1991; Comerino, 1982). Pruitt-Igoe became a proxy for these arguments, a grindstone for many axes. Architects eager to carve out a new arena of practice used Pruitt-Igoe as a proxy to attack the Modernist masters. Sociologists saw in the tower blocks a metaphor for the perceived

dissolution of Black family life amid mass migration and urbanization. Planners, in uenced by Jacobs and Newman, circled wagons around the notion that high-rise superblocks yielded pathological environments of crime, fear, poverty, and despair. For most observers, Pruitt-Igoe was the canary in the coal mine, signaling a wave of failures that would plague high-rise projects over the decades.

Unfortunately, none of the critiques provides a useful framework for understanding Pruitt-Igoe speci cally or the fate of public housing generally. While the project clearly failed by any reasonable measure of performance, the modernist high-rise form was never inherently prob-lematic, as many people around the world live successfully in high-rise housing; nor is public housing programmed or destined to fail: New York City has retained nearly all of its public stock, and many housing projects around the country continue to provide much-needed afford-able housing, especially for the elderly. The notion that projects lack defensible space and, therefore, provide breeding grounds for crime does not explain high crime rates in older, low-rise neighborhoods. Indeed, in St. Louis, crime rates in several low-rise neighborhoods were consistently higher than in Pruitt-Igoe. The problems and challenges of Black families in public housing have always had much more to do with racism, oppression, poverty, and welfare policies than with housing form.

The central factor in the decline of projects like Pruitt-Igoe,

Cabrini-Green, and Robert Taylor Homes lies in the broader economic and social landscape of the American metropolis during the second

half of the 20th century. Pruitt-Igoe had been conceived and built for an overcrowded city, where future growth in population and industrial employment was assumed. Unfortunately, by the time the rst tenants moved in to the project, that imagined city of the future was already beginning to unravel. The systematic dislocation of capital from

central cities beginning in the 1950s resulted in staggering losses of jobs and tax base. As Whites ed the city in search of better employment and housing opportunities, cities lost still more wages and tax base, and struggled to support an increasingly poor and elderly population with fewer and fewer resources. White ight in St. Louis and other cities opened up housing in neighborhoods once off limits to Black families. As Blacks spread out into the city, housing projects experienced increas-ing vacancy rates. Since the maintenance of projects has to come from tenant rents, vacancies spelled looming disaster for many housing authorities.

Pruitt-Igoe was in fact a canary in the coal mine, but for something much larger than the decline of one federal housing program. Rather, the failure of the project registered the massive seismic shifts already underway in Northeastern and Midwestern cities through capital ight, disinvestment, suburbanization, and population decline. These shifts registered rst at Pruitt-Igoe because the scale of population and job loss in St. Louis was so severe and rapid, and the tools available to planners and of cials to mitigate the disaster were so limited by the city’s xed boundaries. The same processes gripped Chicago and New York, for example, but at a slower rate, allowing for more adjustments over time.

Through all of these transformations, Pruitt-Igoe doggedly

remained a symbol of failed government policies, and the blast image made its way into dozens of textbooks on planning, policy, social sci-ence, and architecture. It became the classic cautionary tale, the go-to symbol either for the failure of modern urban planning and design or for the shortcomings of the welfare state. In 1992, when U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp and President George Bush announced the initiative that would become HOPE VI, they made explicit reference to Pruitt-Igoe as an example of failed liberal policies of the past. The critical discourse surrounding Pruitt-Igoe, then, informed the winding down of conventional public housing as well as the programs created to replace it.

References

Bailey, J. (1965). The case history of a failure. Architectural Forum, 123(12), 23.

Bristol, K. (1991). Pruitt-Igoe and other stories. Journal of Architectural Education, 44(3), 163–171.Blake, P. (1977). Form follows asco: Why modern architecture hasn’t worked. Boston, MA: Atlantic Monthly.

Comerio, M. (1981). Pruitt-Igoe and other stories. Journal of Architec-tural Education, 34(1), 26–31.

Jencks, C. (1977). The language of post-modern architecture. New York,

heathcott - pruitt-igoe & critique of public housing

heathcott - pruitt-igoe & critique of public housing

heathcott - pruitt-igoe & critique of public housing

heathcott - pruitt-igoe & critique of public housing

NY: Rizzoli.

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