REGULATIONANDCAPITALIZATIONOFENVIRONMENTALAMENITIES:
EVIDENCEFROMTHETOXICRELEASEINVENTORY
INMASSACHUSETTS
LindaT.M.BuiandChristopherJ.Mayer*
Abstract—EnvironmentalregulationintheUnitedStateshasundergoneaslowevolutionfromcommandandcontrolstrategiestowardsmarket-basedregulations.OnesuchinnovationistheToxicsReleaseInventory(TRI),aregulationthatrequirespolluting rmstopubliclydiscloseinformationabouttheirtoxicemissions.Thebasictenetofthisregulationisthatitcorrectsforinformationalasymmetriesbetweenpollutersandhouseholds,allowingcommunitiestopressurepolluterstodecreasetheiremissions.Policy-makershavejudgedtheTRIatremendoussuccess,asnationalreleasesdeclinedby43%between1988and1999.YetmanyofthefundamentalproblemswhichareknowntoleadtotheclassicfailureoftheCoasetheorem(suchashightransactioncostsanddif cultiesinorganizing)castdoubtontheeffectivenessofdisclosurerules,alone,toleadtoanef cientoutcomeinthecaseofpollution.Weuseaneventstudymethodologywithhigh-qualitydataonhousepricesandotherlocalattributestoassesstheextenttowhichthepublicvalueschangesintoxicreleasesandthusthesuccessofTRI.Ourmajor ndingsinclude:(1)declinesintoxicreleasesappearunrelatedtoanypoliticaleconomyvariablesthatmightleadtopublicactivism;(2)initialinformationreleasedunderTRIhadnosigni canteffectonthedistributionofhouseprices;and(3)housepricesshownosigni cantimpactofdeclinesinreportedtoxicreleasesovertime.Standarderrorsaresmallenoughthatwecanrejectthehypothesisthatlargedeclinesintoxicreleasesleadtomorethana0.5%increaseinhouseprices.TheseresultsalsoholdwhenwecontrolfordifferencesintheavailabilityofinformationonTRIandthepossibleeffectofexpectations.Our ndingscastdoubtontheabilityofthepublictoprocesscomplexinformationonhazardousemissionsandsupporttheCoasetheoreminthatright-to-knowlawssuchasTRImaynotbethemosteffectiveformofenvironmentalregulation.
I.Introduction
E
NVIRONMENTALregulationintheUnitedStateshasundergoneaslowevolutionfromcommandandcontrolstrategiestomoremarket-basedapproaches.Inpart,thistransitionisinresponsetotheoverwhelminggrowthinthedirectcostofregulationandthepriceofmeetingthoseregulations.IntheUnitedStates,pollutionabatementcon-trolexpendituresareontheorderof1.5%–2.5%ofGDPperyear.Asthetrendtowardsstricter,morepervasiveenviron-mentalregulationcontinues,boththecostandtheeffective-nessofregulationhavebecomehottopicsonthepublicagenda.
Onesuchmarket-basedinnovationadoptedbytheU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)istorequirepol-luting rmstopubliclydiscloseprivateinformationabouttheiremissions.Thebasictenetofthisregulationisthatit
ReceivedforpublicationOctober27,2000.RevisionacceptedforpublicationDecember4,2002.
*BostonUniversityandTheWhartonSchool,UniversityofPennsyl-vania,respectively.
TheauthorswishtothankseminarparticipantsattheWEAmeetings,theJFKSchool,ColumbiaUniversity,BostonUniversity,UniversityofTo-ronto,andTheWhartonSchool,alongwithKatherineCarmen,LisaGeorge,WayneGray,JoeGyourko,CharlieHimmelberg,BobInman,JoelWaldfogel,MartyWeitzman,andtwoanonymousreferees,forhelpfulcomments.Anyerrorsareourown.
correctsforinformationalasymmetriesthatmayexist.1OneofthemostpervasiveexamplesofthisistheEmergencyPlanning,CommunityRighttoKnowAct(EPCRA).Theappealofthistypeofregulationisevidencedbytheprolif-erationofcommunityright-to-knowlawsatthestatelevel.Theselawstakevariousforms—fromrequiringstateagen-ciestoprovideenvironmentaldatathroughtheInternet,toincreasingthereportingrequirementsforpollutingplants.Usingdisclosureofprivateinformationasaninformalregulatorytoolisattractivebecauseitisrelativelylow-cost.Theoretically,boththecash-starvedregulatoryagencyandtheregulatedplantcouldfacelowerpollutionabatementcontrolexpenditures.Insteadofdirectlyregulatingplantsandensuringcompliance,theenforcementagencyonlywouldberesponsibleforcollectingandmaintainingapub-licdatabase,increasingcommunityawareness,andpenal-izing rmsforinaccuratereporting.Apolluting rmwouldbefreetochoosehowmuchtochangeitsemissionsandtousewhateverabatementtechnologyitwanted.Communitypolicingwouldpressure rmstoreduceactualemissions.Inthispaper,wefocusononeexampleofthistypeofregulation,calledtheToxicsReleaseInventory(TRI).In-troducedbytheEPAundertheEPCRAin1986,TRIrequiresmanufacturingplantsthatemitmorethanagiventhresholdlevelofanylistedtoxicsubstancetoprovideemissionsdatatotheEPAforuseinapubliclyavailabledatabase.PriortotheTRI,norecordoftoxicemissionsexisted.
Between1988and1999,TRIreportedemissionsfellbyapproximately40%.Supportforcommunityright-to-knowlegislationandtheTRIisverystrong.InapresidentialmemodatedAugust8,1995,theadministrationwrotethattheEPCRAof1986“...providesaninnovativeapproachtoprotectingpublichealthandtheenvironmentbyensuringthatcommunitiesareinformedaboutthetoxicchemicalsbeingreleased...”andthat“...Right-to-Knowprotectionsprovideabasicinformationaltooltoencourageinformedcommunity-basedenvironmentaldecisionmakingandpro-videastrongincentiveforbusinessesto ndtheirownwaysofpreventingpollution.”TheapparentsuccessoftheTRIinreducingreportedtoxicemissionshasmadetheTRIand
Thedisclosureofprivateinformationhasbeenusedasaregulatorymechanisminseveralinstances.Oneexampleistherequiredlabelingofnutritionalcontentsonfoodpackages,andanotheristheOccupationalSafetyandHealthAct,whichrequiresemployerstoinformemployeesaboutworkplacehazards.Theeffectivenessofsuchregulation,toourknowledge,hasnotbeenveri edempirically.
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TheReviewofEconomicsandStatistics,August2003,85(3):693–708
©2003bythePresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollegeandtheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
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