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Capital Account Policies and the Real Exchange Rate

Capital Account Policies and the Real Exchange Rate

Olivier Jeanne

Abstract

This paper presents a simple model of how a small open economy can undervalue its real exchange rate using its capital account policies. This paper presents several properties of such policies, and proposes a rule of thumb to assess their welfare cost. The model is applied to an analysis of Chinese capital account policies.

JEL Codes: F31, F32, F36.

Keywords: capital flows, capital controls, real exchange rate, international reserves, sterilized foreign exchange reserve intervention, financial repression, mercantilism, China.

1 introduction

There are debates about the extent to which emerging market and developing countries that have accumulated large amounts of foreign exchange reserves in the 2000s are doing so in order to undervalue their currency. However, we do not have a simple model of how a country can achieve persistent real exchange rate distortions through reserve accumulation. The main purpose of this paper is to present such a model and to use it to answer a few questions about undervaluation policies. Real exchange rate undervaluation is often presented, in policy debates, as the result of a monetary operation. For example, it is argued that the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has resisted the appreciation of the renminbi by pegging the nominal exchange rate and accumulating reserves. But pegging the nominal exchange rate is not the same thing as pegging the real exchange rate, and we know that in an environment without nominal frictions monetary policy has virtually no impact on real variables. It is unlikely, furthermore, that nominal frictions alone give monetary policy enough leverage to have a persistent impact on the real exchange rate. Standard estimates suggest that nominal stickiness is not persistent enough to induce large and persistent deviations of the real exchange rate from its exible-price equilibrium value (Rogo , 1996; Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2002). In order to achieve persistent real undervaluation, thus, monetary policy must rely on something else than just nominal stickiness. I focus in this paper on the role of imperfect capital mobility. Imperfect capital mobility can be de ned, for the purpose of my analysis, as any friction inducing a deviation from Ricardian equivalence in capital ows. Imperfect capital mobility could result from “natural causes,” such as nancial frictions that prevent the private sector from borrowing abroad, or deviations from rational expectations that mitigate or delay the private sector’s Ricardian response to reserve accumulation. Imperfect capital mobility could also be policy-induced and result from capital account restrictions that are imposed by the government. The fact that the country that has accumulated the most reserves in the 2000s, China, also imposes tight restrictions on its capital account suggests that the link between the two is worth looking at. Thus, this paper will focus on the question of how the real exchange rate is a ected by capital account policies, de ned in a broad way as the accumulation of foreign assets and liabilities by the public sector plus all the policies that a ect the private sector’s access to foreign capital. However most of my results can be extended to the case where Ricardian equivalence fails because of frictions other than capital account restrictions

In order to simplify and streamline the analysis, I use a model that is entirely real—there

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