The security of a network configuration is based not just on the security of its individual components and their direct interconnections, but also on the potential for systems to interoperate indirectly across network routes. Such interoperation has been s
isariskthatanattackerwhohastheabilitytocompromisesecurityonB2orlowerassuredsystemscancopyTtoSonSys.E,toSonSys.HtoStoConSys.G.ThisiscontrarytotherequirementthatthelevelofassurancethatTcannotbecopiedtoCshouldbeB3orhigher.Thisrequirementismetbytheindividualsystemsbutnotasaresultoftheirinteroperation.Ageneralisedformofthecascadevulnerabilityproblemisde nedasfollows.
2.1.1MLS
Amultilevelsecuresystemenforcesalattice-basedsecuritypolicyLofsecuritylevelsthathasorderingrelation≤.Givenx,y:Lthenx≤ymeansthatinformationmay owfromlevelxtolevely,forexample,C≤S≤T.
2.1.2AssuranceLevels
Securitycriteriade nealattice,A,ofassurancelevelswithordering≤.Givenx,y:A,thenx≤ymeansthatasystemevaluatedatyisnolesssecurethanasystemevaluatedatx,oralternatively,thatanattackerthatcancompromiseasystemevaluatedatycancompromiseasystemevaluatedatx.LetSde nethesetofallpossiblesystems.Wede neaccred:S→Awhereaccred(s)givestheassurancelevelofsystems:S,andistakentorepresenttheminimume ortrequiredbyanattackertocompromisesystems.
2.1.3AcceptableRisk
Securityevaluationcriteriaalsode neanacceptableriskfunctionrisk:L×L→A,suchthatgivenl,l′:Lthenrisk(l,l′)de nestheminimumacceptableriskofcompromisefromltol′;itrepresentstheminimumacceptablee ortrequiredto‘compromisesecurity’andcopy/downgradeinformationfromlevelltolevell′.Withoutanylossofgeneralityweassumethatthereisnosecurityenforcementatthelowestassurancelevel0,andthus,ifl≤l′thenrisk(l,l′)=0.Forexample,thefunctionriskencodestheassurancematrixforthe‘B’levels(from
[28,29])1,2and3,with:0representingnosecurityenforcement,asrisk(C,S)=risk(C,T)=risk(S,T)=0,risk(S,C)=1,risk(T,S)=2,andrisk(T,C)=3,andsoforth.
2.1.4EvaluatedSystems
Individualsystemsmustbeassuredhigherthantheminimumacceptablerisktocompromisethedatatheystore.Ifasystemscanholdinformationatlevelslandl′thenrisk(l,l′)≤accred(s).
2.1.5NetworkModel
Asystemnodeinournetworkmodelisapair,ls,andrepresentsthefactthatsystemscanholdinformationatlevell.Thus,asystemisacollectionofnodesthatrepresentthedataitholds.Forexample,inFigure1,Sys.Ecanstore
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