文档下载 文档下载导航
设为首页 | 加入收藏
搜索 请输入内容:  
 导航当前位置: 文档下载 > 所有分类 > 人文社科 > 教育学/心理学 > Political Business Cycles:A Theoretical Appraisal
侵权投诉

Political Business Cycles:A Theoretical Appraisal

Political Business Cycles:A Theoretical Appraisal

2politicalbusinesscyclesOnemaythenpositaretrospectivevotingfunctionforanelectionattheendofperiodt,oftheform:

!TÀ1XVt¼CgðsÞLðUtÀs;ptÀsÞð2Þ

s¼0

yieldingthenumberofvotesVtfortheincumbentasadecreasingfunctionoflossfromeconomicoutcomesðC0o0Þ.TheexogenouslengthoftimebetweenelectionsisTperiods,andg(s)istheweightvotersputonalosssperiodsinthepast.g(s)isassumedtobedecreasingins,thatis,pasteconomicout-comeshaveasmallereffectonvotesattthefurtherinthepasttheyare.Ifg(s)israpidlydecreasingins,veryrecenteventsareweightedmostheavily.Intheextreme,ifgðsÞ¼0fors40,thenonlyeconomicoutcomesintheyearoftheelectionaffectvoting.Theelectoralmechanismisnotmademorespeci c.Onecouldaddastochasticelementtoallowforthepossibilityofanin-cumbentlosingtheelection.

IntheNordhausmodel,thestructureoftheeconomyissummarizedbyanexpectations-augmentedPhillipscurverelatingthedifferencebetweentheactualandthenaturalratesofunemploymentUNttothedifferencebetween

eactualandexpectedin ationpt:

eUt¼UNtÀðptÀptÞð3Þ

Toclosethemodelonemustspecifytheformationofexpectations.Crucialtothemainresultsoftheabovemodelsissomeformofbackward-lookingexpectations,sothatin ationarypolicyinanelectionperiodisnotfullyanticipatedandcanthereforelowertheunemploymentrate.Astandardformulationofadaptivedeterminationoftheexpectedrateofin ation:

epet¼ptÀ1þaðptÀ1ÀptÀ1Þð4Þ

whereaisacoef cientbetween0and1representingthespeedwithwhichexpectedin ationadaptstopastexpectationalerrors.Thismaybesolvedtoyieldpetasaweighteddecliningsumofpastin ationrates.

Thisfour-equationsystemmaythenbesolvedforunemploymentandin ationovertheelectoralcycle.Whenvotershave‘shortmemories’(g(s)smallfors40)apoliticalbusinesscyclewillemergeiftheincumbentwantstomaximizehisprobabilityofre-election.Intheperiodimmediatelyaftertheelectionthegovernmentengineersarecessionviacontractionarymonetarypolicytobringdownin ationaryexpectations.Theincumbentkeepseco-nomicactivitylowtokeepexpectedin ationlowuntiltheperiodimmedi-atelybeforethenextelection,sothatagivenrateofeconomicexpansion(inducedbyamonetarysurprise)canbeobtainedatarelativelylowrateofin ation.Thegovernmentthenstimulatestheeconomyviaexpansionarymonetarypolicy,unemploymentfallingduetohighunanticipatedmoneygrowth.Thelevelsofmonetaryexpansionandunemploymentarethosewhichmaximizevotersatisfactionintheelectionperiod.Inthenextelectioncyclethesamebehaviourisrepeated,withcontractionarymonetarypolicytobringdownin ationexpectations.Hence,thepossibilityofin uencingtheprobabilityofre-election,combinedwiththestructureoftheeconomy,yieldsacycleineconomicactivitywhichwouldnotbepresentwithaplannerwithanin nitehorizon.Thepoliticalcyclethusinducesacycleineconomicactivityandin ation.

Thoughthesemodelscapturetheincentiveforopportunisticpolicymakerstomanipulatepolicyandthemacroeconomiccyclethatmayresult,anumberofconceptualandempiricalobjectionsmayberaised.First,incumbentsrunningforre-electiondonotcontrolmonetarypolicyincountrieswith

上一页第2页

你可能喜欢

热门文档

相关文档

站点地图 | 文档上传 | 侵权投诉 | 手机版
本站所有资源均来自互联网,本站只负责收集和整理,均不承担任何法律责任,如有侵权等其它行为请联系我们.
文档下载 Copyright 2013 doc.guandang.net All Rights Reserved.  -  email