2013 21st Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed, and Network-Based Processing
SecMon: A Secure Introspection Framework for Hardware Virtualization
Xiaolong Wu1,2, Yunwei Gao2, Xinhui Tian2, Ying Song2, Bing Guo1, Baiming Feng3, Yuzhong Sun2
1
College of Computer Science, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064, China, 164191107@qq.com
2
State Key Laboratory of Compute Architecture, ICT, CAS, Beijing 100190, China
3
Northwest normal university, Lanzhou 730070, China
monitor Domain-U's memory it developed a series of user-level interface functions on the basis of this mapping function. Based on XenAccess, most of the existing security protection systems are developed. However, the following problems exist in all systems above. First, when Domain-0 is attacked, the running state of memory in Domain-U may be tampered with malicious programs in Domain-0. It is a threat to Domain-U. Second, in application layer of Domain-0, there are not only plenty of tools, but also a large amount of codes. According to the statistics, the amount of code in the tools directory of the Xen-4.1.0 is 134MB. Such large user-level tools indeed expand the attack surface of Domain-U. Last but not least, in para-virtualized domain the monitoring virtual machine (Domain-0) uses modified Linux as the operating system. As we know, most of anti-virus software running on Windows operating system is impossibly executed in Domain-0, which limits the use of the virtual machine monitoring technology.
Therefore, we propose a framework that establishes a Windows system monitoring virtual machine called
Keywords- cloud computing; virtualization; virtual machine Priv_WinDom in hardware virtual machine (HVM) Domain, introspection; hardware virtual machine; static metrics which is assigned the access permission to map other
Domain-Us’ memory. Additionally, we construct the monitoring mechanisms in Priv_WinDom to combine with I. INTRODUCTION
the anti-virus software installed in Windows system. In order
As the basis of cloud computing, the virtualization
to avoid the interference of Domain-0, we revoke the
technology is paid more and more attention from academia
memory mapping permission owned by Domain-0 after the
and industry. By usage of virtualization technology lots of
virtual machine in HVM Domain is built successfully. To
systems and architectures have been developed to build a
further prevent the invasion by Domain-0 in the booting
trusted environment. However these systems providing the
process of virtual machines in HVM Domain, a static
protection mechanism itself should be ensured security,
measure mechanism is added according to hardware
which is also a major problem needed to be concerned about.
virtualization features in the booting process to ensure the
In the meanwhile, as the current popular virtualization
security of system loading.
software on x86 platforms, Xen is more and more widely
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
used. Some hardware virtualization technologies, such as
z We build a secure monitoring framework, in which a
Intel's VT technology, enable full virtualization available on
monitoring virtual machine is constructed in HVM
Xen. These technologies bring new methods as well as
domain to prevent Domain-U from the security threats
generate new problems to the existing security protection
brought about by the user-level tools of Domain-0. In
mechanism.
the meanwhile we ensure the security of the monitoring
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is the key
virtual machine itself from two aspects: the booting
technology widely used in the existing security protection
process and runtime. During the booting process, a new
system. To implement this technology, almost all of the
static measure mechanism is implemented considering
existing methods utilize the privileged virtual machine
hardware virtualization features.
Domain-0 to serve as the monitoring virtual machine to map
z To extend the scope of application of virtual machine
the memory of the general virtual machine (Domain-U). In
introspection technology, we construct a Windows
this way, Domain-0 is able to do runtime dynamic inspection.
monitoring virtual machine. Compared to the existing
In fact, this method essentially makes use of the memory
Linux monitoring virtual machine (such as Domain-0),
mapping function provided by the application layer of
our monitoring virtual machine provides the underlying
Domain-0. Take XenAccess [1] for example, in order to
Abstract—With the fusion of cloud computing and virtualization technology, system security under virtualization becomes a key point in recent research. As a foundational technology to construct a secure system, virtual machine introspection receives more attention than ever. Almost all of the existing virtual machine monitors take the privileged virtual machine (Domain-0) as the monitoring machine, which ignore the threats brought by Domain-0 because of its huge code base of user-level tools. Besides, para-virtualized machines cannot provide the basic support for popular security applications of Windows operating system. This paper proposes a secure monitoring framework based on hardware virtualization. We use Windows operating system to build a monitoring virtual machine in hardware virtual machine domain, and set up monitoring mechanism in it. In addition, the security of the Windows monitoring machine itself is ensured all through its lifetime -- bootstrap and runtime. The experiments show our secure monitoring system performs well in the secure monitoring process. The performance overhead it brings is considered to be acceptable.
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