Abstract. We examine various indistinguishability-based proof models for key establishment protocols,
ExaminingIndistinguishability-BasedProofModelsforKey
EstablishmentProtocols
Kim-KwangRaymondChoo&ColinBoyd&YvonneHitchcock
InformationSecurityInstitute
QueenslandUniversityofTechnology
GPOBox2434,Brisbane,QLD4001,Australia
{k.choo,c.boyd,y.hitchcock}@qut.edu.au
Abstract.Weexaminevariousindistinguishability-basedproofmodelsforkeyestablishmentprotocols,
namelytheBellare&Rogaway(1993,1995),theBellare,Pointcheval,&Rogaway(2000),andtheCanetti
&Krawczyk(2001)proofmodels.Wethenconsiderseveralvariantsoftheseproofmodels,identifyseveral
subtledi erencesbetweenthesevariantsandmodels,andcomparetherelativestrengthsofthenotionsof
securitybetweenthemodels.Foreachofthepairofrelationsbetweenthemodels(eitheranimplicationor
anon-implication),weprovideproofsorcounter-examplestosupporttheobservedrelations.Wealsoreveal
adrawbackwiththeoriginalformulationoftheBellare,Pointcheval,&Rogaway(2000)model,whereby
theCorruptqueryisnotallowed.Asacasestudy,weusetheAbdalla&Pointcheval(2005)three-party
password-basedkeyexchangeprotocol(3PAKE),whichcarriesaproofofsecurityintheBellare,Pointcheval,
&Rogaway(2000)model.Werevealapreviouslyunpublished awintheprotocol,anddemonstratethat
thisattackwouldnotbecapturedinthemodelduetotheomissionoftheCorruptquery.
1Introduction
Keyestablishmentprotocolsareusedfordistributingsharedkeyingmaterialinasecuremanner.How-ever,despitetheirimportance,thedi cultiesofobtainingahighlevelofassuranceinthesecurityofalmostanynew,orevenexisting,protocolsarewellillustratedwithexamplesoferrorsfoundinmanysuchprotocolsyearsaftertheywerepublished(Bao2003,Pereira&Quisquater2003,Wan&Wang2004,Wong&Chan2001,Zhang2005).Thetreatmentofcomputationalcomplexityanalysisadoptsadeductivereasoningprocesswherebytheemphasisisplacedonaprovenreductionfromtheproblemofbreakingtheprotocoltoanotherproblembelievedtobehard.SuchanapproachforkeyestablishmentprotocolswasmadepopularbyBellare&Rogaway(1993)whoprovidethe rstformalde nitionforamodelofadversarycapabilitieswithanassociatedde nitionofsecurity(whichwerefertoastheBR93modelinthispaper).Sincethen,manyresearche ortshavebeenorientedtowardsthisendwhichhaveresultedinnumerousprotocolswithaccompanyingcomputationalproofsofsecurityproposedintheliterature.
TheBR93modelhasbeenfurtherrevisedseveraltimes.In1995,BellareandRogawayanalysedathree-partyserver-basedkeydistribution(3PKD)protocol(Bellare&Rogaway1995)usinganexten-siontotheBR93model,whichwerefertoastheBR95model.Amorerecentrevisiontothemodelwasproposedin2000byBellareetal.(2000),hereafterreferredtoastheBPR2000model.Collectively,theBR93,BR95,andBPR2000modelswillbereferredtoastheBellare–Rogawaymodels.Inindependentyetrelatedwork,Bellareetal.(1998)builtontheBR93modelandintroducedamodularproofmodel.However,somedrawbackswiththisformulationwerediscoveredandthismodularproofmodelwassubsequentlymodi edbyCanetti&Krawczyk(2001),andwillbereferredtoastheCK2001modelinthis


paper.
Examining Indistinguisha... 暂无评价 22页 免费 Cryptographically...Security Models and Proofs for Key Establishment Protocols.... . . Polynomial-time Distinguish...
t Bochum Juni 26, 2007 ?Genuine“ Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange[DH76] 2-...Examining Indistinguishability-Based Proof Models for Key Establishment Protocols...
Examining Indistinguisha... 暂无评价 22页 免费 Cryptographically...Security Models and Proofs for Key Establishment Protocols.... . . Polynomial-time Distinguish...
热门文档